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ABSTRACT 
 
The classic question in international law concerns its effective-
ness. Today, this old debate concerns the usefulness of treaties.  Yet 
those engaging in this debate share a common problem.  They 
evaluate treaty success by focusing on the effects of treaties on one 
type of actor:  states.  This narrow lens is misguided; it leads to a 
skeptical view of the effectiveness of treaties because of the num-
ber of countries declining to negotiate, adopt, ratify, or enforce 
treaties.  
This article challenges this skeptical view by introducing the 
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concept of “treaty penumbras” to explain how even treaties reject-
ed by state actors exert considerable effects on the actions of an 
important non-state actor:  transnational businesses.  This article 
identifies three types of penumbral effects:  pre-emption, coordina-
tion, and noise.  Pre-emption effects encourage businesses to up-
grade their self-regulation when a treaty is imminent.  Coordina-
tion effects galvanize business actors to support (or oppose) treaty 
norms, and noise effects increase external pressure for corporate 
reform.  Each of these effects magnifies the reach of treaties over 
businesses but these effects are unnoticed in the traditional legal 
framework that prioritizes state behavior.  
Penumbral effects have important policy and academic impli-
cations.  National policymakers, individually and collectively, in-
creasingly target corporate transgressions globally, such as human 
rights abuses, environmental contamination, and financial miscon-
duct.  Treaties are designed to address these very problems but are 
increasingly limited in doing so under the traditional “statist” 
framework.  In contrast, this article offers strategies for operation-
alizing penumbral effects to reach corporate conduct through trea-
ty regulation.  For academics, penumbral effects necessitate re-
evaluation of both the criteria used for evaluating the effectiveness 
of treaties and the conclusions reached under that evaluation.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The classic question in international law concerns its effective-
ness, especially concerning the use of treaties.  Those engaging in 
this debate tend to evaluate treaty success by focusing on the ef-
fects of treaties on one type of actor:  states.1  In contrast, this article 
introduces the concept of treaty penumbras to explain how treaties 
exert effects on non-state actors—effects that are generally unno-
ticed in both academic and political circles.2  Treaty penumbras ne-
cessitate a re-evaluation of how international legal scholars meas-
ure a treaty’s success and the conclusions reached under such 
evaluation.  
For treaties affecting business activity, a treaty’s penumbra re-
fers to its indirect effects on corporations and other business enter-
prises.  Although penumbral effects may influence the behavior of 
other non-state actors, this article focuses on the effects on business 
actors because their conduct is increasingly the subject of treaty 
regulation.  
Traditionally, states were the relevant audience for treaties be-
cause most treaty obligations concerned state behavior:  waging 
war, reducing tariffs, claiming territory, punishing war crimes, ex-
ploring space, etc.  But today’s global problems are not the fault of 
states alone.  Global businesses pollute waterways,3 employ slave 
                                                     
1 Shima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 743 MINN. L. REV. 
743, 747 (2013) (“[T]he current theories of international law inappropriately con-
centrate on states rather than individuals.”). 
2 This article is part of a broader conversation regarding the role of private 
actors within international law.  Recent scholarship in this area has focused on the 
role of private actors in international law-making.  See, e.g., Julian Arato, Corpora-
tions as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 237 (2015) (discussing the “internation-
alized” power of contract); Melissa Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63, 
109 (2013) (discussing the importance of aligning stakeholder interests with treaty 
goals for “persuasion treaties”); Paul Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1573, 1595–1617 (2011) (discussing participation by private actors in “up-
stream” and “downstream” law production).  But see Baradaran et al., supra note 
1, at 765 (discussing the motivations of private actors to comply with international 
law). 
3 See Clifford Krauss, Big Victory for Chevron Over Claims in Ecuador, N.Y. 
TIMES (March 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/business/federal-
judge-rules-for-chevron-in-ecuadorean-pollution-case.html [https://perma.cc/
P5L9-YA2R] (reporting allegations against Chevron); Laura Smith-Spark, Farmers 
Sue Oil Giant Shell Over Niger Delta Pollution, CNN (Oct. 24, 2012), 
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labor,4 and cheat government regulations,5 to name a few recent 
transgressions.  Therefore, when evaluating a treaty’s success, it is 
important to understand and account for a treaty’s effects on these 
businesses actors.6   
The ways that treaties affect businesses are surprising.  The fa-
miliar story is that treaties command businesses only when they 
first command states that, in turn, command businesses; treaties do 
not command businesses directly.  Unfortunately, this chain of 
command is breaking down in the 21st century.  States may be less 
willing to create treaties.7  When they do sign a treaty, domestic 
legislatures often resist ratification.  Many treaties have died in the 
United States Senate.8  When this occurs, a treaty cannot reach 
                                                                                                                        
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/11/world/europe/netherlands-nigeria-shell-oil/ 
[https://perma.cc/S855-BPKF] (reporting pollution allegations against Shell). 
4 Edvard Pettersson & Robert Burnson, Nestle Accused of Putting Fish from 
Slave Labor in Cat Food, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-08-27/nestle-accused-of-putting-fish-from-slave-labor-in-cat-
food [https://perma.cc/6J5P-2G7J] (“Nestle SA was sued over claims that its Fan-
cy Feast cat food contains fish from a Thai supplier that uses slave labor.”). 
5 Vanessa Houlder, Vincent Boland & James Politi, Tax Avoidance: The Irish 
Inversion, FIN. TIMES: COMMENT (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/
d9b4fd34-ca3f-11e3-8a31-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/2NK9-WKLA] (dis-
cussing mergers between U.S. companies and foreign companies in order to lower 
tax rates). 
6 See Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 801–16 (assessing rates and reasons for 
corporate compliance with financial transparency laws). 
7 See Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jans Wouters, When Structures Be-
come Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
733, 734–75 (2014) (collecting data from official sources—including the United Na-
tions, the United States, and other sovereign governments—that suggests multi-
lateral treaty-making is “stagnating”). 
8 See Associated Press, US Senate Rejects UN Treaty on Disability Rights Amid 
GOP Opposition, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/dec/04/senate-rejects-un-treaty-disability [https://perma.cc/Y8Y7-
A4W2] (demonstrating an instance of this when the United States Senate declined 
to ratify the UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities).  See also Lisa Baldez, 
U.S. Drops the Ball on Women’s Rights, CNN (March. 8, 2013) http://
www.cnn.com/2013/03/08/opinion/baldez-womens-equality-treaty/ [https://
perma.cc/8UN8-8CUK] (noting that the United States is only one of seven UN 
member nations that has failed to ratify the U.N. Convention to Eliminate All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women); David D. Caron, The U.S. Must Ratify 
the Law of the Sea Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/05/19/global-priorities-in-the-arctic/
the-us-must-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty [https://perma.cc/N6RQ-RUVA] 
(describing the US failure to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea); Joe 
Lauria, Why Won't the US Ratify the UN's Children's Rights Convention?, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1
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business conduct.  Or at least, that is the conventional wisdom.  
This article challenges this view by arguing that treaties can af-
fect businesses even when treaties fail at some stage from negotia-
tions to ratification.  These failed treaties continue to influence 
business behavior through a range of “penumbral effects.”  These 
effects do not command a business to obey a treaty, but they none-
theless improve business compliance with treaty norms by altering 
the environment in which businesses operate.9  This article identi-
fies three types of penumbral effects:  pre-emption, coordination, and 
noise.   
Pre-emptive penumbral effects encourage business actors to im-
prove the quality of their voluntary regulation in a particular poli-
cy area, such as environmental contamination or labor practices.  
These effects are apparent when a treaty is on the horizon.  Indus-
try actors opposed to treaty regulation in the policy area will up-
grade the quality of their voluntary regulation in order to demon-
strate the efficacy of private regulation. 
This is an old idea applied to a new context.  In the domestic 
setting, policymakers are more than familiar with the likelihood of 
industry good behavior under the shadow of new or enhanced 
regulation.10  These “spillover effects” are documented in policy 
areas as diverse as environmental disclosures11 to credit card inter-
                                                                                                                        
HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
joe-lauria/why-wont-the-us-ratify-th_b_6195594.html [https://perma.cc/8WRT-
UHBE] (noting that the United States is one of only three countries that has not 
ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).   
9 See, e.g., Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Insti-
tutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 147, 150–54 (Walter W. Powell & 
Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (discussing factors that drive institutional change 
within organizations). 
10 See, e.g., John W. Maxwell et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Polit-
ical Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 613 (2000) (con-
cluding that corporations are more likely to engage in voluntary self-regulation as 
political pressure and the threat of formal regulation increases). 
11 Hyunhoe Bae, Voluntary Disclosure of Environmental Performance: Do Public-
ly and Privately Owned Organizations Face Different Incentives/Disincentives?, 44 AM. 
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 459, 460 (2012); Eun-Hee Kim & Thomas P. Lyon, Strategic Envi-
ronmental Disclosure: Evidence from the DOE’s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry, 61 
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 311, 326 (2011); Erin M. Reid & Michael W. Toffel, Re-
sponding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of Climate Change Strate-
gies, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1157, 1164–67 (2009). 
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est rates.12  Pre-emptive penumbral effects are the global equiva-
lents of this domestic practice.  These penumbral effects can rein-
force under-enforced treaties or disseminate norms from treaties 
that never emerged. 
Coordination penumbral effects occur when businesses rally 
around a treaty, or prospective treaty, to support or resist it.  If 
they support it, they use it as the basis for their own contracts or 
industry standards, even when no state commands them to do so.13  
If they resist it, they will coordinate their opposition against it, but 
this opposition forces industry actors to recognize industry issues 
and begin to identify solutions.  Regardless of whether the treaty 
wins industry favor or resistance, the common outcome is that the 
treaty galvanizes industry actors into action in a manner they 
would not were it not for the treaty (or prospective treaty). 
Finally, treaties are noisy.  We are accustomed to witnessing 
triumphant presidents sign treaties before global audiences, pre-
cipitating media pundits to disseminate and scrutinize, praise, and 
censure.  These noise penumbral effects create pressure for businesses 
to reform their current practices by raising awareness of policy is-
sues and risking reputational shaming of recalcitrant business ac-
tors.  Even treaties that never reach this stage may attract noise be-
cause of the attention that the resistance draws. 
These penumbral effects are especially important in the current 
political environment—both domestic and international—that pos-
es risks to treaty-making and successful implementation.14  Pe-
numbral effects partially compensate for treaty failures when we 
are primarily concerned with the behavior of non-state actors.  A 
treaty that ultimately “fails” because of a breakdown in the treaty 
                                                     
12 Victor Stango, Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card 
Market, 46 J.L. & ECON. 427, 430 (2003). 
13 See Natasha Affolder, The Market for Treaties, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 159, 161 
(2010) [hereinafter Affolder, The Market for Treaties] (explaining that treaty norms 
from international environmental treaties are incorporated into private contracts).  
See also Anne van Aaken, Effectuating Public International Law Through Market 
Mechanisms?, 165 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 33, 41 (2008) (explaining incentive 
structures for encouraging market actors to comply with public international law); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
129, 133 (explaining how market mechanisms, as part of a private governance 
scheme, offer “the standard-setting, implementation, monitoring, enforcement, 
and adjudication roles traditionally played by public regulatory regimes”). 
14 See infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1
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process may still precipitate spillover effects within the shadow re-
gions of the treaty where voluntary industry regulation occurs.   
Critically, a treaty may not need to emerge for these penumbral 
effects to occur.  The treaty process itself involves important fea-
tures that can affect the quality of industry self-regulation, includ-
ing identification of deficiencies with current self-regulatory pro-
jects, articulation of policy recommendations, increased 
coordination among stakeholders, and reputational shaming.  
Viewing treaties in this manner preserves their important role in 
the regulation of international affairs but adapts this role in light of 
contemporary challenges.   
This article illustrates treaty penumbral effects with a case 
study of a potential treaty that also involves both high stakes and a 
high risk of failure:  an international treaty on transnational busi-
ness and human rights.  In 2014, the Human Rights Council estab-
lished an open-ended intergovernmental working group 
(OEIGWG) to elaborate an international legally binding instrument 
on transnational corporations and other business enterprises re-
garding respect for human rights.15     
Business and human rights provides a good case study for 
studying penumbral effects for the following reasons.  First, this 
treaty may fail spectacularly, as some have already predicted.  In 
that case, it is important to examine the regulatory effects of the 
treaty-making process itself, as opposed to the treaty outcome, to 
understand better the effect of this process on the behavior of the 
non-state actors the treaty is addressing.  Second, many regulatory 
methods were attempted over the past few decades to reform 
transnational business conduct.  Some of these methods relied on 
hard law strategies whereas others favored non-binding approach-
es.  This history provides important information regarding the effi-
cacy of these various regulatory methods, including how the for-
mer interacted with and influenced the latter.   
This article is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the tra-
ditional framework for evaluating the effectiveness of treaties that 
privileges the effects of treaties on state actors as opposed to non-
state actors.  This section explains why these criteria for effective-
                                                     
15 U.N. Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an International Legally Binding 
Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect 
to Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 24, 2014). 
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ness are no longer tenable in light of fractured international politics 
and the rising role of multinational corporations.  Section 3 de-
scribes the primary contribution of the article:  an alternative theo-
retical framework for assessing the effectiveness of treaties that ac-
counts for treaty effects on businesses.  This section explains the 
regulatory benefits of “penumbral” effects:  preemption, coordina-
tion, and noise.  Section 4 applies this theoretical framework to a 
case study on business and human rights, concluding with an as-
sessment of how this case study illustrates penumbral effects in 
practice.  Finally, Section 5 outlines strategies for operationalizing 
penumbral effects and implications of this framework for policy-
makers.  
 
2.  EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS:  THE STATIST VIEW OF TREATY 
SUCCESS 
 
A treaty is an international agreement between states whereby 
they bind themselves legally to act in a particular way.16  For cen-
turies, treaties regulated conduct on the international stage.17  The 
scholarship on the effectiveness of international law is vast, and 
this Section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive account.  
Instead, it examines a common thread within this literature:  its fo-
cus on state behavior.18    
                                                     
16 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 332, 333 (defining the role and purpose of treaties in international law); 
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the consent-
based nature of treaties). 
17 See MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY 31–52 (5th ed., 2014) (providing excerpts from treaties over the cen-
turies). 
18 See, e.g., Joel Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: 
The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 127, 127 
(2010) (“If international law is to be a useful tool of international cooperation, we 
must know more about its social effects: its ability to cause states to take action 
that they would not have taken, or to refrain from taking action that they would 
have taken but for the existence of the international law rule.”).  See also Ryan 
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Hu-
man Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 623 (2004) (explaining that an understanding of 
“the social forces that shape the behavior of states” is necessary when grappling 
with questions of international regime design); Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-
Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002) (noting that 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1
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 This focus not only influences the scholarship on treaties but 
also the study of international law generally.  This focus is under-
standable because many of the global problems that international 
law addresses result from state behavior.  The Section below dis-
cusses both the importance of studying state compliance as well as 
the limitations of this focus.   
 
2.1.  Focusing on Core Effects:  State Compliance 
 
The state centric evaluation of treaty success focuses on the ef-
fects of a treaty on conduct by state actors.19  This makes sense giv-
en that treaties are ultimately international agreements between 
states.  Treaties are negotiated, drafted, signed, and ratified by 
state actors with the intent of influencing state behavior going for-
ward.  Consequently, the evaluation of treaty success historically 
focused on the effects of treaties on state behavior; this is referred 
to as the “core” effects of treaties.  This focus encourages interna-
tional law scholars to evaluate state compliance with international 
legal rules20 and offer explanations for compliance (or non-
compliance).21  Some scholars explain compliance with reference to 
                                                                                                                        
most international law scholars believe that international law “matters,” that it 
“affects the behavior of states,” and introducing a comprehensive theory to ex-
plain why states are influenced by international law); Harold Hongju Koh, Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (suggesting 
that the concept of transnational legal process—the process by which domestic 
legal systems internalize international norms—is fundamental to understanding 
why sovereign states obey international law). 
19 Baradaran et. al, supra note 1, at 747. 
20 See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 83–85 (2007) (analyzing trends in investment treaty 
arbitration using empirical data on the identity and number of parties involved 
and on the resulting outcomes); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties 
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1968–76 (2002) (measuring state compliance 
with international treaty rules on genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil lib-
erties, and political representation of women); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 
Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 345, 347 (1997) (“[T]he dearth of good empirical studies of correspondence 
between state behavior and international legal rules and decisions is a serious ob-
stacle to adequate understanding and evaluation of the international legal sys-
tem.”).  But see Baradaran et. al, supra note 1, at 804–06 (measuring private actor 
compliance with financial transparency laws). 
21 Guzman, supra note 18 (“Indeed, the absence of an explanation for why 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
 
286 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
 
 
rational actor theories.  According to Andrew Guzman, states act 
from rational self-interest and choose to comply (or not) based on 
calculations of reputational costs and direct sanctions associated 
with violating international law.22  Joel Trachtman similarly em-
ploys a rationalist model of compliance but disaggregates the state 
unit to examine the effects of domestic political processes on a 
state’s decision to comply or violate international law.23   
In contrast, another group of scholars emphasizes the im-
portance of international legal rules and their associated regimes in 
encouraging compliance.  The “managerial school” of Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Chayes prioritizes cooperation rather than 
sanctions.24  They focus on encouraging compliance through “justi-
fication, discourse, and persuasion.”25  Thomas Franck emphasizes 
the characteristics of the rules we want obeyed, explaining that the 
fairness of international legal rules encourages states to comply.26  
Fairness of rules depends upon both procedural and substantive 
fairness and particularly depends upon determinacy, symbolic val-
idation, coherence, and adherence.27  
                                                                                                                        
states obey international law in some instances but not others threatens to under-
mine the very foundations of the discipline.”).  For a literature review of dominant 
theories of compliance with international law see Guzman, supra note 18, at 1823; 
Hathaway, supra note 20, at 2002–20; Kingsbury, supra note 20, at 348. 
22 See id. at 1860–61 (“The decision to honor or breach a promise made to an-
other state imposes costs and benefits upon the promising country and its deci-
sion-makers. The model assumes that decision-makers behave in such a way as to 
maximize the payoffs that result from their actions. Thus, where the benefits of 
breach outweigh its costs, a country is expected to violate its agreements with 
other states. International law succeeds when it alters a state's payoffs in such a 
way as to achieve compliance with an agreement when, in the absence of such 
law, states would behave differently.”) (internal citations omitted).  
23 See Trachtman, supra note 18, at 131 (“Compliance with international law 
can be analyzed by reference to the domestic political coalitions that exist in order 
to induce entry into the international legal rules, as well as those that will be pre-
cipitated by the establishment of the international legal rule.”). 
24 See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) 
(discussing the managerial approach to compliance).  
25 Guzman, supra note 18, at 1830–32; Hathaway, supra note 20, at 1955–57; 
Koh, supra note 18, at 2636. 
26 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7 
(2002) (explaining that states tend to comply with international law when these 
rules satisfy expectations of distributive justice and right process). 
27 See id. at 30–46 (providing more detailed definitions of the four factors). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1
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A final group of scholars emphasizes the role of norm diffusion 
and socialization on encouraging compliance.  Harold Koh focuses 
on the dissemination of international legal rules into domestic legal 
regimes, arguing that the “process of interaction, interpretation, 
and internalization of international norms into domestic legal sys-
tems is pivotal to understanding why nations ‘obey’ international 
law.”28  Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks highlight the relationship 
between state compliance and acculturation—“the general process 
by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the 
surrounding culture.”29 
These research questions are undoubtedly important for both 
international legal scholars and policymakers.  Every legal field 
must possess some level of self-awareness regarding its authority 
over its own subjects, especially about whether the latter listen and 
the reasons they do.  This knowledge is also important for policy-
makers who set trade terms, honor territorial boundaries, disci-
pline corporate activity, and even wage wars against this back-
ground of knowledge.   
Unfortunately, this research reveals only a partial picture of 
how international law works.  It ignores the effects of international 
law’s key instrument—treaties—on a significant class of global ac-
tors:  corporations and other business enterprises.30  As explained 
below, this neglect compromises the study and practice of interna-
tional law in significant ways. 
 
                                                     
28 Koh, supra note 18, at 2603.  See also id. at 2646 (“One or more transnational 
actors provokes an interaction (or series of interactions) with another, which forc-
es an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. 
By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to 
internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's 
internal normative system. The aim is to ‘bind’ that other party to obey the inter-
pretation as part of its internal value set.”). 
29 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 18, at 626. 
30 Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 747 (“Whether international law is ulti-
mately effective in accomplishing its goals may depend less on whether a state 
complies and more on whether sub-state entities act consistently with the goals of 
international law. This misplaced focus on nations as the primary actors in inter-
national law neglects key players in international law: individuals and firms.”). 
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2.2.  The Limitations of the Statist View 
 
The problem with the state centric evaluation of treaties is that 
it is insufficient to address two significant challenges in the 21st 
century.  First, we need to care about treaty effects beyond the state 
because corporations create a range of transnational harms that al-
so need regulation; therefore, we need to know about non-state ac-
tor compliance with treaties.  Second, as discussed below, we wit-
ness warning signs suggesting that it is becoming more difficult to 
get treaties across the finish line.  That is why it is also important to 
consider the regulatory effects of treaties at various stages—
negotiation and drafting, adoption, signature, and ratification—
upon corporations and other business actors because these effects 
suggest strategies for achieving treaty success despite the limita-
tions with the state-centric approach discussed below.  
  
2.2.1.  Need to Regulate Corporations 
 
States are not the only actors in need of international regula-
tion.  Instead, our daily headlines tell us why it is important to 
regulate at least one type of non-state actor:  transnational busi-
nesses.   
Shell and Chevron face accusations of dumping oil into local 
waterways in Nigeria and Ecuador, respectively.31  Apple faces 
similar allegations of pollution problems in its global supply chain, 
including using Chinese factories that fail to comply with regula-
tions, discharge toxic metals, ignore the health concerns of local 
communities, and dispose of hazardous waste in problematic 
ways.32  Shell also came under heavy scrutiny in Kiobel v. Royal 
                                                     
31 See Krauss, supra note 3 (describing claims by Ecuadorean farmers that 
Chevron had polluted local sections of the Amazon River with millions of gallons 
of toxic wastewater); Smith-Spark, supra note 3 (reporting that Nigerian farmers 
and an environmental group brought suit against Shell for polluting local water 
sources with oil over a period of several years). 
32 See David Barboza, Apple Cited as Adding to Pollution in China, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://nyti.ms/1OdXYoc [https://perma.cc/9Q5M-PXKU] (de-
scribing a report released by an environmental policy institute in Beijing accusing 
Apple suppliers of repeatedly failing to properly dispose of hazardous and toxic 
waste); Xie Xiaoping, Apple Wakes up to Chinese Pollution Concerns, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
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Dutch Petroleum for its involvement in massive human rights viola-
tions in Nigeria.33  Even Disney is under fire.  Labor activists ac-
cuse the cartoon giant of using children to make toys for other 
children, as well as contracting with factories that push workers to 
perform three times the overtime permitted by law.34   
We witness these practices because of the “governance gaps 
created by globalization - between the scope and impact of eco-
nomic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage 
their adverse consequences.”35  National regulators are stretched to 
their limit to control business behavior because businesses can re-
locate to a place where the regulators’ laws do not apply and 
where local laws are absent or unenforced.36  The countries in 
which corporations operate are constrained in their ability to regu-
late the conduct of transnational corporations operating within 
their borders.37  Limited institutional capacity may constrain their 
ability to enforce their laws; however, sometimes host states pur-
posefully avoid laws proscribing certain forms of corporate con-
                                                                                                                        
4, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/04/apple-
chinese-pollution-concerns [https://perma.cc/ASF4-MPTX] (describing pollution 
problems in Apple’s supply chain). 
33 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (listing the violations of the law of nations al-
leged by the Nigerian plaintiffs); Nina Totenberg, Human Rights Victims Seek Rem-
edy At High Court, NPR (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.npr.org/
2012/02/28/147507940/human-rights-victims-seek-remedy-at-high-court 
[https://perma.cc/JWU2-HCTL] (describing the plaintiffs’ claims that Shell 
“worked hand-in-glove with the Nigerian military to brutally suppress any oppo-
sition to the way the company operates”). 
34 Gethin Chamberlain, Disney Factory Faces Probe into Sweatshop Suicide 
Claims, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/
aug/27/disney-factory-sweatshop-suicide-claims [https://perma.cc/D38F-4BS5] 
(reporting that Disney’s toys from the movie “Cars” were made with child labor). 
35 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterpris-
es), Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Framework]. 
36 See Tricia D. Olsen, Access to Remedy: Accountability for Allegations of 
Corporate Human Rights Abuse in Latin America 5–6 (September 16, 2016) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining that a significant number 
of allegations of corporate misconduct are not met with any remedies). 
37 Beth Stephens, Making Remedies Work: Envisioning a Treaty-Based System of 
Effective Remedies, in BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS (Surya Deva 
& David Bilchitz eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 5–6, 15–17) (discussing various 
limitations with obtaining remedies against transnational corporations in host 
states). 
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duct in an effort to attract investment.38   
 
2.2.2.  Risks to Future Regulation by Treaties 
 
The second limitation with the statist view is that, although we 
need to regulate transnational businesses, treaties may not be up to 
this task.39   
Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel, and Jans Wouters identify the 
reduced number of multilateral treaties deposited with the United 
Nations Secretary General in recent decades.40  They interpret these 
declining figures as signs of “stagnation” in multilateral treaty 
making in the 21st century.41  The problems do not end with treaty 
creation.  Even if state officials can agree on a treaty, they often 
need the support of domestic legislatures, but this support is not 
always forthcoming.42  For example, senators have communicated 
                                                     
38 See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business En-
terprises), Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶¶ 29–30, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (noting the lack of government regulations relat-
ed to social and human rights issues, which sometimes requires companies to take 
on quasi-governmental functions to fill the void); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan 
Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Govern-
ance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 503 (2009) 
(analyzing the ways in which nongovernmental actors can innovate international 
regulation); Framework, supra note 35, ¶ 14 (describing how some states lack regu-
latory enforcement capabilities or may choose not to utilize it to attract interna-
tional business and investment). 
39 See, e.g., Doug Cassel & Anita Ramasastry, Anatomy of a Business and Human 
Rights Treaty?, INST. HUM. RTS. & BUS.: COMMENTARY (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/anatomy-business-and-human-rights-
treaty.html [https://perma.cc/WA33-N37K] (“Current international law imposes 
certain human rights obligations on business, but the coverage is incomplete, in-
direct and largely ineffective.”). 
40 Pauwelyn et al., supra note 7, at 734.  See also KENNETH W. ABBOTT ET AL., 
HARV. PROJECT CLIMATE AGREEMENT DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 13-57, ORGANIZATIONAL 
ECOLOGY IN WORLD POLITICS: INSTITUTIONAL DENSITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRATEGIES 2 (2013), http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/dp57_abbott-
green-keohane.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5AM-RMUH] (noting the decline in both 
formal international law-making and formation of intergovernmental organiza-
tions).  Some argue, however, that the treaty projects of the present era address 
more niche and controversial topics, thereby compromising cooperation. 
41 Pauwelyn et al., supra note 7, at 734.   
42 Associated Press, supra note 8.   
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opposition to ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea,43 the Trans-Pacific Partnership,44 and the Paris Climate 
Agreement.45   
Do these signs signal the end of treaty making in the 21st cen-
tury?  Perhaps not.  But they do signal that treaties may have an 
uncertain future and there is a need for adaptation, be it great or 
small.  The extent of the treaty uncertainty affects the degree of ad-
aptation.  The Section below explains how international lawyers 
and scholars can adapt treaties under different conditions of uncer-
tainty to exert regulatory effects on businesses.  As discussed be-
low, a “treaty as process” approach can produce valuable side-
effects that are often neglected when we focus only on the regula-
tory effects of treaties as products.  The treaty process can itself 
                                                     
43 See Julian Pecquet, Opposition to Law of the Sea Treaty Heats Up, HILL (May 
25, 2012), http://thehill.com/policy/international/229637-opposition-to-law-of-
the-sea-treaty-heats-up [https://perma.cc/5YE2-RSCX] (reporting that twenty-
seven U.S. Senators had signed a letter expressing opposition to the ratification of 
the convention). 
44 Sen. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should 
Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), http://wpo.st/fN081 [https://perma.cc/
D92N-KBBY] (arguing that the TPP’s arbitration clause would undermine U.S. 
sovereignty). 
45 Timothy Cama, GOP Chairman Blasts Paris Climate Accord, HILL (Dec. 12, 
2015), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/263049-gop-chairman-
blasts-paris-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/WV3N-S4PC] (“[Senator] Inhofe, 
an outspoken doubter of the human role in climate change, has worked in recent 
months to undermine the agreement and demand that it be submitted to the Sen-
ate for approval, which it would not get.”).  
Over the past few decades, regulatory networks have emerged as popular fora for 
international policy-making.  Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law 
Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 290–91 (2011); Kal Raustiala, The Ar-
chitecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transna-
tional Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L. 113, 118 (2009); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 283, 290 (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global In-
formation Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1053 
(2003); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of In-
ternational Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 284–85 (1998).  
In these networks, government actors come together to share information, harmo-
nize rules, and improve enforcement activities in a range of issue areas, including 
securities regulation, banking supervision, insurance, and the environment.  
Raustiala, supra, at 12; Zaring, supra, at 282.  For example, many issues in cross-
border financial regulation are addressed within networks through informal pro-
cesses.  Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 735, 737–39, 745–48 (2014). 
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create side-effects with significant implications for the success of 
other regulatory strategies that also aim to constrain transnational 
business behavior.  The treaty process, therefore, can bolster the ef-
ficacy of these other institutions.  
 
3.  FROM CORE TO PENUMBRA:  TREATY EFFECTS BEYOND THE 
STATE 
 
The problem with the state-centric evaluation of treaty success 
is that it neglects that treaties can have indirect effects on business 
actors without the active involvement of state actors.  This belief 
understandably fuels a pessimistic view of treaties because of the 
difficulties with obtaining state cooperation in the treaty process.   
Fortunately, treaties have significant effects on actors beyond 
the state by offering a complex range of incentives to a diverse 
range of business actors.  This analysis reveals three important in-
sights about treaties that relate to audience, effects, and measuring 
success.   
Treaties have at least two sets of distinct audiences and, there-
fore, exert at least two different types of effects.  The most familiar 
audience is states; traditional legal scholarship focuses on a treaty’s 
effects on compliance by state actors (“core effects”), as discussed 
in Section 2.1., supra.  
However, treaties also exert important effects on actors beyond 
the state.  Treaty norms intended for adoption and enforcement by 
states can influence private ordering between business actors.46  A 
number of businesses incorporate treaty norms into private con-
tracts between themselves and their suppliers or in codes of con-
duct within particular industries.47  Multi-stakeholder groups also 
develop their own techniques for disseminating international law 
norms within their own communities.48       
                                                     
46 See Affolder, The Market for Treaties, supra note 13 (explaining that treaty 
norms from international environmental treaties are incorporated into private 
contracts).  See also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 133 (; Aaken, supra note 13. 
47 See, e.g., Affolder, The Market for Treaties, supra note 13, at 161, 168–89 (de-
tailing corporate engagement with international treaties). 
48 See infra, note 62 and accompanying text. 
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These are some of the many ways that treaties have a private, 
non-state audience.  For the purpose of this article, these are “pe-
numbral effects” of treaties and are distinguishable from a treaty’s 
“core effects” on states.  There are three primary forms of penum-
bral effects on transnational businesses:  pre-emption, coordination, 
and noise.  Pre-emptive effects can precipitate industry regulation by 
businesses in an attempt to demonstrate the efficacy of voluntary 
regulation and discourage future treaty regulation.  Coordination 
effects occur because treaties, in their various stages of develop-
ment, offer strong incentives for private coordination in regulation.  
Finally, noise effects result from the attention received by a treaty 
making process that creates and sustains pressure for reform.   
These effects are important because they offer strategies for 
achieving treaty success despite the limitations with the state-
centric approach discussed in Section 2.2., supra.  First, penumbral 
effects concern the regulatory effects of treaties on businesses.  As 
such, they identify ways to regulate transnational business conduct 
using the traditional international law mechanism of a treaty. 
Second, penumbral effects offer different strategies for address-
ing “treaty uncertainty”:  the likelihood of state cooperation in the 
negotiation, drafting, adoption, signing, and ratification of future 
treaties.  The type of penumbral effects we can expect depends on 
the nature and severity of the treaty uncertainty.  If this treaty un-
certainty is weak so that the overall number of treaties created re-
main the same or decrease without disappearing altogether, then 
we can expect all three types of effects, including pre-emptive pe-
numbral effects. 
If the treaty uncertainty is strong, then state cooperation is un-
likely regarding any future treaty and industry actors will realize 
this.  In this situation, preemptive penumbral effects are unlikely, 
but the process of treaty negotiations and drafting still create two 
important penumbral effects, noise and coordination, that create 
beneficial spillover effects.  These different penumbral effects are 
summarized in Table 1 and described below.   
 
Table 1: Types of Penumbral Effects 
Treaty Uncertainty Penumbral Effect 
Weak Pre-emptive Effects  
Noise Effects 
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Coordination Effects 
Strong Noise Effects 
Coordination Effects 
 
Treaty uncertainty does not exist as a binary; this uncertainty 
can occur along the range between strong and weak.  We may also 
witness a blending of penumbral effects.  Although pre-emptive 
penumbral effects may dissipate if the treaty uncertainty is strong, 
noise and coordination effects can accompany both strong and 
weak treaty uncertainty; however, these effects are more important 
when the treaty uncertainty is strong because they represent the 
most robust penumbral effects and best hope for stimulating in-
dustry regulation.  
Finally, penumbral effects are important because they partially 
compensate for the absence of a treaty when the absent treaty tar-
gets business behavior.  Treaty enthusiasts may wish to answer all 
forms of transnational business misconduct with a treaty.49  How-
ever, such a possibility is unlikely even if the treaty uncertainty is 
weak.  Penumbral effects partially compensate for this absence by 
fostering renewed voluntary regulation. 
The penumbral effects are even more important when the trea-
ty uncertainty is strong and the prospect of a treaty remote.  In 
these situations, the most viable form of regulation may be volun-
tary regulation.  Penumbral effects demonstrate how treaty-
making processes can facilitate such regulation.   
 
3.1.  Weak Treaty Uncertainty:  Pre-Emption Penumbral Effects 
 
     If the number of treaties that states produce stays the same 
or declines without disappearing, then the treaty-making process 
                                                     
49 Joost Pauwelyn & Liliana Andonova, A "Legally Binding Treaty" or Not? The 
Wrong Question for Paris Climate Summit, LINKEDIN (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/legally-binding-treaty-wrong-question-paris-
climate-summit-pauwelyn?trk=mp-reader-card (https://perma.cc/35SE-B3EV) 
(“[T]he idea of a ‘binding treaty’ continues to be portrayed as the Holy Grail, a 
silver bullet that will solve all problems. This is wrongheaded. Making something 
a ‘binding treaty’ at the international level does not, as such, add much. Yet, it 
takes longer to negotiate and ratify, may reduce the level of ambition, sets the is-
sue in stone and limits the parties involved to states.”). 
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can produce important spillover effects that partially compensate 
for treaties that fail to emerge.  Even a decline in treaties is not the 
same thing as the extinction of treaties.  A decline is important be-
cause it suggests that treaty regulation may not be available to ad-
dress important international issues in the future.  However, so 
long as states remain capable of creating treaties, albeit at a lower 
rate, the treaty-making process can incentivize another form of 
regulation:  voluntary industry regulation.  
In the domestic setting, scholars in law and economics and 
management studies observed improvements in self-regulation in 
the period following the announcement of potential impending 
public regulation.50  Pre-emptive penumbral effects are the global 
equivalents of these domestic phenomena.  These penumbral ef-
fects can reinforce under enforced treaties or disseminate norms 
from treaties that never emerged.  Similar to the domestic situa-
tion, the regulatory threat of a treaty—manifested by the onset of a 
treaty drafting and negotiation process—may incentivize im-
proved voluntary regulation as industry actors ramp up efforts at 
voluntary regulation in anticipation of a treaty that is heading 
down the road. 
These pre-emptive penumbral effects are different from the 
way we usually envision and expect treaties to operate.  Here, trea-
ties provide the incentive to self-regulate; they are not the sources 
of substantive rules and do not provide mechanisms for enforce-
ment.  Instead, these functions are performed by private standard-
setting and a widening range of regulatory strategies.51  These pre-
emptive effects make two important regulatory contributions.  
First, they may occur even if a final treaty never enters into force.  
Second, these effects could partially compensate for the absence of 
                                                     
50 See Maxwell et al., supra note 10, at 613 (“When it is costly for consumers to 
organize and to influence the political process, firms can match the net utility con-
sumers expect from regulatory controls with a lower level of voluntary controls 
and can thereby deter consumer groups from mobilizing to enter the political pro-
cess. As the threat of regulation grows, for example, because of reductions in consumers’ 
informational and organizational costs, self-regulation becomes more stringent.”) (em-
phasis added); Stango, supra note 12, at 434 (“Within 1 day after the threat, two of 
the largest issuers in the country (AT&T and First Chicago) immediately an-
nounced interest rate cuts . . . . These initial responses were followed by an indus-
try-wide period of rate cutting.”).    
51 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 514–18 (describing various forms of 
regulatory standard-setting schemes involving a variety of stakeholders). 
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a final treaty because these effects stimulate another kind of regula-
tion:  voluntary regulation. 
Will penumbral pre-emptive effects always accompany a pro-
spective treaty?  No.  Preemptive effects rely on certain treaty con-
ditions, as explained in the following hypotheticals.  
In Hypothetical 1, assume that state parties adopt Treaty A on 
child labor but fail to adopt a subsequent Treaty B on child labor.  
The treaty-making process for Treaty B can incentivize voluntary 
self-regulation related to child labor that partially compensates for 
the failure of Treaty B to result.  For treaty enthusiasts, the best-
case scenario is if states sign and ratify Treaty B.  If Treaty B is not 
adopted and ratified, the second best outcome is for the pre-
emptive effects associated with the treaty process for Treaty B to 
stimulate improved behavior by industry actors.  
The fact that state parties adopted and ratified Treaty A results 
in stronger signals to industry during the treaty negotiation for 
Treaty B, increasing the likelihood of improvements in voluntary 
regulation.    
In Hypothetical 2, assume that there is no Treaty A on child la-
bor but that states had created Treaty C on arms trading.  Preemp-
tive effects can still occur in a policy area previously unregulated 
by treaties so long as other treaties emerge.  Treaty C could still in-
centivize voluntary regulation during the treaty negotiation pro-
cess for Treaty B because Treaty C demonstrates to industry actors 
that states are still willing and capable of producing treaties.  Ab-
sent other factors, industry actors may not be able to predict that 
an overall decline in treaty making will result in reduced treaty 
making in the particular policy area affecting them, i.e. child labor.  
The problem arises when there is no Treaty C (or Treaty D, E, 
etc).  Hypothetical 3 lacks both Treaty A (on child labor), Treaty C 
(on arms trading), or any other recent treaty.  If signs not only indi-
cate the decline of treaties but also the end of treaties per se, then 
the signals to industry during the treaty-negotiation process are 
likely insufficient to incentivize pre-emptive industry regulation.52  
When that credibility is gone, so is the likelihood of pre-emptive 
                                                     
52 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 39 (1992) (explaining that it is “the existence and sig-
naling of the capacity to get as tough as needed [that] can usher in a regulatory 
climate that is more voluntaristic and nonlitigious” with most of the regulatory 
action occurring in the realms of self-regulation.). 
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self-regulation.  However, as discussed below, the treaty-making 
process can still generate important spillover effects based on the 
noise generated and the incentives for coordination.  
Finally, even if penumbral pre-emptive effects do occur, one 
may reasonably wonder what is to prevent a business from rolling 
back its voluntary practices if the treaty-making process breaks 
down and the treaty threat abates.  In this situation, industry may 
refrain from adopting additional initiatives or commitments, but it 
is unlikely that they will roll back their current practices.  First, 
businesses broadcast their good practices in sustainability reports 
that they post to their corporate website or file with the UN Global 
Compact (if they are members).53  These sites usually contain sev-
eral years’ worth of reports.54  NGOs and consumers who consult 
these websites will therefore notice any backsliding.    
Second, company policies may similarly prove difficult to roll 
back after institutional changes have occurred, such as improved 
training, enhanced feedback, integrated human rights decision-
making, and improved due diligence.  Finally, industry initiatives 
are even more difficult to ignore.  A number of these initiatives in-
volve other stakeholders who will notice, and likely publicize, in-
dustry abandonment of initiatives.55   
                                                     
53 See generally ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2014 (2014), 
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-
report/2014/servicepages/downloads/files/entire_shell_sr14.pdf?cat=b 
[https://perma.cc/V5TJ-3MKK] (describing the self-disclosure by Royal Dutch 
Shell as to its practices in 2014); Communication on Progress 2014, UNITED NATIONS 
GLOBAL COMPACT (Apr. 34, 2015), 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/cop/create-and-
submit/advanced/142431 [https://perma.cc/4FCD-AVPG] (providing further 
background for Shell’s disclosures). 
54 Shell’s website allows the viewer to compare Shell’s 2014 Report with its 
previous report from 2013.  Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, SHELL, 
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2014/our-approach/living-by-
our-principles/human-rights-and-indigenous-peoples.html [https://perma.cc/
54VQ-TWR7] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).  See also Royal Dutch Shell plc, UNITED 
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-
gc/participants/8082-Royal-Dutch-Shell-plc#cop [https://perma.cc/F7SA-
C3YM] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (providing links to Shell’s communications on 
progress from 2004–2014). 
55 See, e.g., Accountability, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://
www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/accountability [https://perma.cc/UCB2-PJFV] 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (keeping companies accountable for following industry 
standards and initiatives). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
 
298 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
 
 
In summary, treaty threats incentivize changes to business 
practices, but there are a variety of other forces (market forces, me-
dia coverage, consumer pressure, NGO lobbying) that keep these 
changes in place. 
 
3.2.  Strong Treaty Paralysis:  Coordination and Noise Penumbral 
Effects 
 
If treaty uncertainty is strong, then it undermines the ability of 
states both to create new treaties and to threaten to create new trea-
ties.  However, even if the prospect of a treaty is remote, the treaty-
making process can create other penumbral effects even if it cannot 
stimulate industry pre-emptive self-regulation.  Specifically, a trea-
ty process can create pressure for industry reform through the 
noise created by the treaty-making process.  Second, prospective 
treaties can also serve as private coordination devices. 
3.2.1.  Coordination Effects 
 
Coordination refers to the ability of many diverse actors to 
work together to achieve a common goal.56  Coordination takes 
many forms and pre-emption is only one example of coordinated 
behavior.  Even if a treaty does not encourage pre-emption by af-
fected business actors, it can still encourage other forms of ex ante, 
and even ex post, coordination.  The type of coordination depends 
on the nature of the treaty uncertainty.  These effects are summa-
rized in Table 2.   
 
Table 2: Types of Private Coordination 
Type of Treaty  
Uncertainty 
Type of Treaty Nature of Private  
Coordination 
                                                     
56 F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconven-
tional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 
345 (2006).   
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Enforcement Treaty in Force Private  
Enforcement 
Ratification  Treaty in  
Waiting 
Private  
Compliance  
Adoption  Prospective Treaties  Private  
Alternatives  
 
If the uncertainty affects state enforcement of treaties but not 
their adoption or ratification, then we already have treaties in force 
and these treaties lower the costs of coordination in a particular 
policy area by providing a template for private parties to use in 
private ordering and therefore increasing the likelihood of private 
enforcement.  Coordination effects through private standard-
setting and private enforcement can partially compensate for the 
ineffective enforcement of treaties already in force.57   
For example, the eight core conventions of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) are reflected in many of the world’s 
dominant industry codes of conduct.  This adoption is important 
because it extends the ILO’s normative standards to a subset of 
corporate actors despite national regulation that, on many occa-
sions, is lacking.58  Second, many of these trade associations also 
provide for the enforcement of these ILO normative standards 
through grievance mechanisms or auditing and certification.59   
                                                     
57 See Affolder, The Market for Treaties, supra note 13 (explaining that corpora-
tions use treaties as sources of private environmental standards).   
58 See Laurence Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: 
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 653 (2006) (discussing 
the increasing discrepancy between treaty adoption and treaty ratification and de-
clining ratification rates of ILO conventions). 
59 For example, the Ethical Trading Initiative is a “leading alliance of compa-
nies, trade unions and NGOs that promotes respect for workers’ rights around the 
globe.”  About ETI, ETHICAL TRADING  INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/
about-eti [https://perma.cc/UCB2-PJFV] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  Its members 
include popular retailers like the Body Shop, Gap, and Tesco.  Our Members, 
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/our-
members [https://perma.cc/G2VN-KF2L] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  The ETI 
Base Code is based upon the ILO conventions and includes the following tenets:  
(1) Employment is freely chosen; (2) Freedom of association and the right to col-
lective bargaining are respected; (3) Working conditions are safe and hygienic; (4) 
Child labour shall not be used; (5) Living wages are paid; (6) Working hours are 
not excessive; (7) No discrimination in practices; (8) Regular employment is pro-
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If the uncertainty affects the entry into force of treaties, then 
“treaties-in-waiting” can encourage private coordination, even 
compliance, depending on the incentives that the treaty offers to 
business actors.60  The distributional outcomes associated with the 
                                                                                                                        
vided; and (9) No harsh or inhumane treatment is allowed.  ETI Base Code, 
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-base-code 
[https://perma.cc/JS9D-5BVX] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).  The ILO core conven-
tions are also reflected in industry codes of conduct, such as the Electronic Indus-
try Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct and the Forest Stewardship Council 
certification standards.  Code of Conduct, ELEC. INDUS. CITIZENSHIP COAL., 
http://www.eiccoalition.org/standards/code-of-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/
9JDF-9G56] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016); Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship 
(Version 4), FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,  https://ic.fsc.org/principles-and-
criteria.34.htm [https://perma.cc/XQP9-QMP2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  All 
member companies of the ETI are expected to abide by the terms of the Base Code 
and ensure that their suppliers comply.  About ETI, supra.  The ETI also includes a 
member-wide grievance mechanism to enforce the provisions of the Base Code.  
Under this grievance mechanism, any ETI member can raise complaints against a 
corporate member or its supplier.  CAROLINE REES & DAVID VERMIJS, MAPPING 
GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARENA, CORP. SOC. 
RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE REPORT NO. 28, 42 (2008).  The ETI Base Code is not only 
enforced at the level of the industry association.  Instead, the different members of 
the ETI also enforce the Base Code at the company level.  For example, the retail 
supermarket Tesco expects all its suppliers to abide by the standards of the ETI 
Base Code.  TESCO, OUR ETHICAL TRADING APPROACH: SUPPORTING DECENT LABOUR 
STANDARDS IN TESCO’S SUPPLY CHAIN 2 (2014), 
http://www.tescoplc.com/assets/files/cms/Resources/Trading_Responsibly/
Our_Ethical_Trading_approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5LQ-YFZW].  It devel-
oped a grievance mechanism for farm level disputes in the Western Cape Region 
of South Africa in order to enforce the standards of the ETI Base Code among its 
fruit suppliers.  Hendrik Kotze, Farmworker Grievances in the Western Cape, South 
Africa, 3 ACCESS CASE STORY SERIES 3 (2014), http://accessfacility.org/sites/
default/files/Farmworker%20Grievances%20Western%20Cape%20South%20
Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE7L-LXRE] (describing how Tesco undertook this 
project in cooperation with the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative (CSRI) of 
Harvard University’s Kennedy School and how both Tesco and CSRI did this pro-
ject on behalf of the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, 
John Ruggie). 
60 For example, The Minamata Convention on Mercury (“Minamata Conven-
tion”) is a global treaty to protect human health and the environment from the 
adverse effects of mercury.  Minamata Convention on Mercury, art. 1, Jan. 19, 
2013, U.N. ENV’T. PROGRAMME, http://www.mercuryconvention.org/
Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata Convention on Mercury_booklet_
English.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBQ5-LTGB] [hereinafter Minamata Convention].  
As of writing, it has 128 signatures and thirty-five ratifications but needs fifty rati-
fications before it enters into force.  Minamata Convention, supra, art. 1; Conven-
tion, MINAMATA CONVENTION ON MERCURY, http://www.mercuryconvention.org/
Convention/tabid/3426/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/L7GJ-LMRZ] (last visit-
ed Nov. 27, 2016).  Despite the fact that it is a treaty-in-waiting, the Minamata 
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treaty text can incentivize industry cooperation even if the treaty is 
not yet in force.  
Finally, if treaty uncertainty affects the possibility of negotiat-
ing, drafting, and adopting treaties, the associated penumbral ef-
fects may still influence industry behavior.  Specifically, prospec-
tive treaties may serve as penalty defaults in both form and 
substance of regulation.  Penalty defaults are legal rules that are so 
undesirable that parties contract around these provisions in order 
to avoid their effects.61  These defaults are non-majoritarian be-
cause the parties will often choose not to adopt these rules.62  How-
ever, penalty defaults exert information-forcing effects by encour-
aging parties to negotiate terms that they might not otherwise 
address. 
A prospective treaty provides a template of the form of regula-
tion that will result if voluntary regulation fails.  As a result, we 
may expect increased industry engagement in voluntary initiatives 
                                                                                                                        
Convention is already driving private action in favor of compliance, at least 
among the world’s dentists.  Dentists care about the Minamata Convention be-
cause one of their primary tools, dental amalgam, is a mercury-added product.  
Dental amalgam contains approximately 50% mercury and forms an intermetallic 
alloy with copper, silver, and tin.  FDI WORLD DENTAL FEDERATION, POLICY 
STATEMENT: DENTAL AMALGAM AND MINAMATA CONVENTION ON MERCURY 1 (2014), 
http://www.fdiworldental.org/media/55201/6-fdi_ps-dental_amalgam_and_
minamata_adopted_gab_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUC2-QK9T].  During ne-
gotiations on the Minamata Convention, the World Dental Federation (FDI) advo-
cated for a reduction (phase-down) in the use of dental amalgam—versus a ban 
(phase-out), and they were successful in obtaining a phase-down.  FDI WORLD 
DENTAL FEDERATION, DENTAL RESTORATIVE MATERIALS AND THE MINAMATA 
CONVENTION ON MERCURY: GUIDELINES FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2014), 
http://www.fdiworldental.org/media/54670/minamata-convention_fdi-
guidelines-for-successful-implementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AEF-RN39].  
This concession to the global dental association prompted the organization to urge 
its members (including national dental associations) to comply with the terms of 
the Minamata Convention even before the Convention is in effect.  The FDI issued 
a recent set of industry guidelines that encourage its member dental associations 
to comply in order to prevent a reconsideration of the concession granted to the 
dental industry under the Convention.  Id. at 6.   
61 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Econom-
ic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“Penalty defaults are designed 
to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the de-
fault rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer . 
. . . [P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want – in 
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third par-
ties (especially the courts).”).   
62 Id. 
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in order to demonstrate the efficacy of an alternative to treaty regu-
lation.63  This is a variant of pre-emptive penumbral effects and is 
dependent upon weak treaty uncertainty. 
If the treaty uncertainty is strong, a prospective treaty serves as 
a penalty default regarding substance because the treaty’s draft 
text may contain terms that industry does not like and may reject.  
However, the draft text already placed certain categories of terms 
on the table.  This influences the mandate of topics and issues ad-
dressed by voluntary regulation.  
 
3.2.2.  Noise Effects 
 
When the treaties at issue concern conduct by transnational 
business actors, the noise surrounding the treaty process creates 
important regulatory effects.  Specifically, the noise alerts the pub-
lic and policymakers to weaknesses with current industry practic-
es, raises awareness of policy issues, creates pressure for reform of 
current business practices, and threatens reputational shaming for 
businesses with poor practice records.  Corporations may not will-
ingly alter their practices without the pressure created by this 
noise.64  This interaction between external pressure and internal 
firm culture emphasizes the importance of a treaty process in 
achieving results. 
These effects are not limited to treaty-making processes.  Media 
campaigns and publicized lawsuits can also create similar pres-
sure.  But the pressure generated by a treaty-making process is dis-
tinguishable in two important ways.  First, prospective treaties 
have a global audience, thereby raising awareness of policy issues 
in a manner difficult to achieve through these other methods.  A 
Virginian resident may be unaware of environmental litigation in 
Germany, but they are likely aware of the climate change summit 
held in Paris in December 2015.  
Second, prospective treaties may serve as harbingers of future 
                                                     
63 Reid & Toffel, supra note 11, at 1162 (“Organizations often respond to 
threats of tighter government regulation by adopting forms of self-regulation in 
an attempt to credibly signal to the government that the desired behavior is occur-
ring even without additional regulation.”). 
64 Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor (Sept. 3, 2015). 
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domestic legislation.  State parties to a treaty routinely undertake 
obligations to enforce the treaty’s substantive rules within their na-
tional jurisdiction.65  Therefore, a treaty may signal future changes 
to the domestic legal regime of a state joining a treaty.  Admittedly, 
this signal depends on the nature of the ratification process.  Busi-
nesses situated in states with simplified ratification processes are 
likely more sensitive to treaty threats compared to their peers in ju-
risdictions with more onerous ratification processes.  This signal 
also depends on the extent of deadlock within domestic legisla-
tures and the prospect for successful ratification of treaties.66   
 
4.  PENUMBRAL EFFECTS IN ACTION:  A REGULATORY HISTORY OF 
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
This Section applies the theoretical framework described in 
Section II to the regulation of international business and human 
rights and evaluates whether this history provides evidence of pe-
numbral effects in practice.  
  The policy area of business and human rights was chosen for 
a number of reasons.  First, it is an area rich in regulatory pluralism 
where a variety of methods are employed to reform transnational 
business conduct.67  Second, there are several decades’ worth of 
regulation in this area.  This Section only focuses on approximately 
                                                     
65 Durkee, supra note 2, at 109. 
66 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-
change-accord-paris.html [https://perma.cc/2VZP-KW5D].  The effects on indus-
try actors may also vary depending on their expectation that a state can effectively 
enforce the treaty’s provisions within domestic law.  See Durkee, supra note 2, at 
91–92 (distinguishing between resolution and persuasion treaties). 
67 See, e.g., California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012) (requiring that covered firms disclose “its efforts to erad-
icate slavery and human trafficking from its direct supply chain for tangible 
goods offered for sale”); HEWLET-PACKARD AGREEMENT, SUPPLIER SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AGREEMENT (2008), http://www.hp.com/
hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supagree.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F9DZ-AGZ5] (describing the company code of conduct); Participation, U.N. 
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation [https://
perma.cc/ELW2-6ULC] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (describing UN guidelines); 
Framework, supra note 35, ¶ 4 (outlining the various methods that John Ruggie has 
employed). 
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the past fifteen years, but the history traces back to at least the 
1970s and the draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corpora-
tions.68  This history provides an opportunity to evaluate how 
these various regulatory methods fared.  Third, globalization exac-
erbates the negative impact of transnational business conduct.69   
Finally, we are at a potentially historic moment in the regula-
tion of business and human rights.  In 2014, a close vote of the 
Human Rights Council established an open-ended intergovern-
mental working group (OEIGWG) to elaborate on an international 
legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises regarding respect for human rights.70  The 
prospects for success are mixed, with some already dooming the 
venture to failure.71  It is more than possible that this prospective 
international instrument may fail to arrive.  That is why it is im-
portant to consider this prospective instrument in its full context 
and examine whether it can still create beneficial regulatory effects 
even if it “fails.”   
  
4.1.  Phase 1:  The United Nations Global Compact 
 
In January 1999, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan 
                                                     
68 David Kinely et al., The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections 
on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, 30 CO. & SECS. L.J. 30, 32 
n.7 (2007). 
69 Chamberlain, supra note 34 (reporting on the use of child labor by factories 
that make Disney toys); Krauss, supra note 3 (iterating Chevron/Texaco’s oil con-
tamination of Ecuadorian rainforest); Smith-Spark, supra note 3 (describing 
Shell’s’ oil contamination in the Niger Delta); Totenberg, supra note 33 (describing 
Shell’s involvement in human rights abuses in Nigeria); Xiaoping, supra note 32 
(explaining the poor environmental practices of Apple’s suppliers in China). 
70 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally 
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Respect to Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014). 
71 See, e.g., John Ruggie, Get Real or We'll Get Nothing: Reflections on the First 
Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Business and Human Rights Trea-
ty, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., http://business-humanrights.org/en/get-real-or-
well-get-nothing-reflections-on-the-first-session-of-the-intergovernmental-
working-group-on-a-business-and-human-rights-treaty [https://perma.cc/23J5-
H7L3] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (“If present dynamics continue, the process is 
likely to yield one of two outcomes: no treaty at all, or one that squeaks through to 
adoption but is ratified by few if any major home countries and thus would be of 
no help to the victims in whose name the negotiations were launched.”). 
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proposed the United Nations Global Compact (the “Compact”) in 
order to improve global corporate conduct in the wake of globali-
zation at the end of the millennium.72  The Compact promotes a set 
of values based on internationally recognized documents, such as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.73   
The Compact is a voluntary initiative.74  As a consequence, 
businesses are encouraged but not required to join the Compact.  If 
a corporation does become a member, it is required to abide by the 
Compact’s ten foundational principles that relate to human rights, 
labor, the environment, and anti-corruption.75  It is also required to 
report annually on its progress towards these commitments by 
submitting a Communication on Progress (COP).76   
The Compact began well with support from at least fifty com-
panies in diverse industries, including mining, banking, pharma-
ceuticals, footwear, and media.77  But not all industry players were 
pleased with the Compact, and the International Chamber of 
Commerce initially opposed it.78   
The Compact also failed to please some actors in the NGO 
community.  Following the announcement of the Compact, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) wrote to the Compact’s founder, UN Secre-
tary General Kofi Annan, sharing its concerns that the effectiveness 
                                                     
72 Press Release, Secretary-General, Executive Summary and Conclusion of 
the High-Level Meeting on the Global Compact, U.N. Press Release SG/2065 (July 
27, 2000) [hereinafter Press Release, UN Global Compact]. 
73 Id. 
74 George Kell, Ann-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, Silent Reform Through 
the Global Compact, 1 UN CHRONICLE 26, 27 (2007). 
75 The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL 
COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles 
[https://perma.cc/D7YH-FM23] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (“Corporate sustaina-
bility starts with a company’s value system and a principled approach to doing 
business. This means operating in ways that, at a minimum, meets fundamental 
responsibilities in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption.”). 
76 Id. 
77 See Press Release, UN Global Compact, supra note 72 (noting the number of 
transnational companies that had pledged to adopt the compact). 
78 David Weissbrodt, Keynote Address, before University of California, 
Berkeley: International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of 
Businesses (Mar. 14, 2008) in 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 373, 384 (2008) (“These inter-
national business organizations—reflecting the most hard-line big corporate per-
spective—oppose any standards that are not voluntary.”). 
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of the Compact would be compromised by a number of design fea-
tures.79  In particular, HRW emphasized the lack of a monitoring 
and enforcement mechanism and the ambiguity of the standards 
presented in the Compact.80  It also communicated its hope that the 
Compact would not serve as a substitute for a legally binding in-
strument but instead serve as its precursor.81   
Lack of credible enforcement mechanisms may have disap-
pointed the NGO sector but that is how some industry actors pre-
ferred it.  According to Maria Livanos Cattaui, secretary-general of 
the ICC, “[b]usiness would look askance at any suggestion involv-
ing external assessment of corporate performance, whether by spe-
cial interest groups or by UN agencies.”82  The ICC preferred to 
honor the original vision of the Compact that did not involve any 
monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.83  This view was con-
sistent with the Compact’s self-image as an initiative that “is not 
and does not aspire to be a legally-binding code of conduct.”84   
 
                                                     
79 Letter from Kenneth Roth, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Watch, to Kofi Annan, 
Secretary-General, United Nations (July 28, 2000), https://www.hrw.org/
legacy/press/2000/07/hrw-ltr-july.htm [https://perma.cc/9LHS-BUW5] [here-
inafter Letter from Roth to Annan]. 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  A few years later, a number of organizations expressed concern that the 
UN Global Compact had become the exclusive regulatory instrument, albeit in 
voluntary form, and may even exert chilling effects on regulatory alternatives.  See 
generally Peter Utting, The Global Compact: Why All the Fuss?, 40 UN CHRONICLE 65 
(2003) (outlining both the positive and negative discussion of the Global Com-
pact). 
82 Maria Livanos Cattaui, Yes to Annan's 'Global Compact' If It Isn't a License to 
Meddle, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/26/
opinion/26iht-edmaria.2.t.html [https://perma.cc/ZF4L-4U3V]. 
83 Nicole Winfield, UN Launches Partnership with Business, Environment and 
Rights Groups, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 27, 2000; Jonathan Birchall, Annan Urges 
Commitment to Ethical Business, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2004), http://on.ft.com/
1nGhPVm [https://perma.cc/6FMU-N364] (“Businesses are wary of the intro-
duction of any compliance element into the compact, while its rapid growth 
means it lacks the resources to provide any system of enforcement.”). 
84 Kell, Slaughter & Hale, supra note 74, at 29. 
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4.2.  Phase 2:  The United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
 
The United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (the “Norms”) 
were drafted by a working group of the United Nations Sub-
Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights.85  
The Norms contained a number of features that concerned mem-
bers of the transnational business community.  
Vocal and persistent opposition came from two global trade as-
sociations:  the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the 
International Organization of Employers (IOE).86  The ICC was 
founded in 1919 and based in Paris, France with membership ranks 
that include thousands of companies from over 130 countries.87  
Similarly, the IOE is the largest organization for employers with 
135 members, including the United States Council for International 
Business.88  Both the ICC and IOE were emphatic that the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights should reject the Norms.89   
The common strain of their opposition concerned the “privati-
zation of human rights.”90  By this phrase, the ICC and IOE feared 
                                                     
85 David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 
AM. J. INT’L L 901, 905 (2003).  See also Weissbrodt, supra note 78, at 381 (explaining 
that the UN Sub-Commission consisted of twenty-six human rights experts from 
twenty-six countries).   
86 UN Observer & Int’l Report, Shell Leads International Business Campaign, 
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (Mar. 15, 2004), https://www.globalpolicy.org/
component/content/article/225/32247.html [https://perma.cc/23E7-CBQZ]. 
87 Direct Members, INT’L CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/worldwide-
membership/members/direct-members/  [https://perma.cc/3LVW-CUPL] (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2016); ICC Global Headquarters, INT’L CHAMBER COM., 
http://www.iccwbo.org/About-ICC/Organization/ICC-Headquarters/ICC-
Global-Headquarters/ [https://perma.cc/L38M-TZHY] (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
88 IOE Members, INT’L ORG. EMPS., http://www.ioe-emp.org/ioe-members/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZWU-23QN] (last visited Dec. 3, 2016). 
89 INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., JOINT VIEWS OF THE IOE AND ICC ON THE DRAFT 
“NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS” 2 (2003), http://www.ioe-
emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Policy%20Areas/business_and
_human_rights/EN/(2003-11)%20Business%20and%20Human%20Rights%
20Draft%20Norms%20joint%20statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPL7-PWFA] 
[hereinafter ICC & IOE, Joint Views on the Draft Norms]. 
90 Letter from Maria Livanos Cattaui, Secretary-General, Int’l Chamber of 
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that the Norms would displace human rights duties from national 
governments to private actors, such as transnational corporations.91   
 In a joint statement, the ICC and IOE explained that “[t]he es-
sential problem with the draft Norms is that it privatises human 
rights by making private persons (natural and legal) the duty-
bearers.  Privatisation leaves the real-duty bearer – the State – out 
of the picture.  This will have profoundly negative consequences, 
legal and practical.”92   
The ICC and IOE insisted that the primary duty-bearers of hu-
man rights are governments, not corporations.93  They criticized 
the Norms for not going far enough to ensure that governments 
possessed the capacity to deliver on their human rights duties and 
instead shifted this burden on to the transnational business sec-
tor.94   
They were equally emphatic that transnational businesses 
could not have human rights obligations under international law 
but only under domestic laws: 
 
                                                                                                                        
Com., to Dzidek Kedzia, Office of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., United Na-
tions 5 (Sept. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Cattaui to Kedzia]. 
91 Thomas Niles (President of the USCIB), UN Code No Help to Companies, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003; John Eaglesham, Business Calls for Action on Human Rights Li-
ability Plan, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004; Alison Maitland, Amnesty Hits Back at CBI 
Stance on Human Rights Plans, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004; ICC & IOE, Joint Views on 
the Draft Norms, supra note 89, at 2 (“The Sub-Commission’s draft Norms is an ex-
treme case of the ‘privatization of human rights.’ Among other things, it shifts 
human rights duties from States to civil society actors.”).  The IOE and ICC em-
phatically stressed this concern, even though Article 1 of the UN Global Norms 
recognizes the distinct and separate roles of government versus business actors: 
“States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, re-
spect, ensure respect of, and protect human rights recognised in international as 
well as national law, including ensuring that transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises respect human rights. Within their respective spheres of ac-
tivity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of, 
and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, in-
cluding the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable 
groups.”  Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm’n on the Promotion and Protect. 
of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights art. 1, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter UN Global Norms]. 
92 ICC & IOE, Joint Views on the Draft Norms, supra note 89, at 4. 
93 Id. at 2–6. 
94 Id. at 12; Niles, supra note 91.   
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  “Only States have legal obligations, so only States can ful-
fil human rights. And, conversely, only a State can violate 
human rights. Private persons are not the duty-bearers of 
the rights in the UN human rights treaties, and related 
agreements: consequently, private actors cannot violate 
human rights. A private actor can violate a national law 
that a State has enacted to implement its international obli-
gations: but a private person is not a ‘human rights viola-
tor,’ properly speaking.’”95   
 
The privatization concern was not the only objection to the 
Norms raised by the ICC, IOE, and other industry actors.  They al-
so objected to the lack of consultation between the drafters of the 
Norms and other stakeholders, such as members of the business 
community.96  Next, they objected to the way the Norms attempted 
to impose direct obligations on corporations.  In the words of Shell 
Vice-President, Robin Aram, “It’s the packaging that business 
doesn’t like. . . . The problem is the legalistic form that has been 
used in drafting the Norms.”97   
Shell was not alone.  A number of other companies also pre-
ferred to leave corporations outside the domain of international ob-
ligations and instead to rely on voluntary initiatives and soft law 
tools.98  David Vasella, former CEO of Swiss drug maker Novartis, 
explicitly stated that he preferred the voluntary initiatives ap-
proach undertaken through the UN Global Compact to the 
                                                     
95 ICC & IOE, Joint Views on the Draft Norms, supra note 89, at 3 (emphasis 
omitted). 
96 David Kinley et al., The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections 
on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, 25 CO. & SEC. L.J. 30, 34 
(2007).  However, some commentators dispute the accuracy of this criticism, 
pointing to a number of multi-stakeholder consultations such as the International 
Business Leaders Forum and the World Business Council for Sustainable Devel-
opment.  Id. at 34–35.  See Emily Rabin, In the Hot Seat: Shell VP Robin Aram, GREEN 
BIZ (June 21, 2004), https://www.greenbiz.com/news/2004/06/21/hot-seat-
shell-vp-robin-aram [https://perma.cc/DQ46-PYKF] (explaining that Reebok and 
Novartis participated in the first round of consultations on the Norms but that 
Shell and the majority of companies did not); Weissbrodt, supra note 78, at 383 
(noting that the subcommittee did reach out to businesses and corporations while 
drafting the Norms). 
97 Rabin, supra note 96 (internal quotations omitted). 
98  Kinley, supra note 96, at 36. 
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Norms.99  According to Vasella, “Our experience demonstrates that 
voluntary standards work. But if the UN norms are adopted as 
currently drafted - policed in ways that have yet to be defined, and 
supported by financial sanctions - we too would have to reject 
them.”100   
The debate over the Norms ended in April 2004 with the deci-
sion of the UN Commission on Human Rights to subject the 
Norms to additional study.101  The Commission requested the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner of Human Rights “to consult with 
all the relevant stakeholders, and to compile a report analyzing the 
Norms in light of the various existing initiatives and standards on 
business and human rights.”102   
Many business groups welcomed the decision.103  As a spokes-
person for the ICC explained, “We’re very pleased with the out-
come and more than happy to take part in an open discussion on 
what business can contribute to promoting human rights.”104   
 
4.3.  Phase 3:  The UN Global Compact Revisited and the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights 
 
The 2004 decision of the UN Commission on Human Rights 
may have terminated the debate regarding the Norms, but it was 
not the end of the business and human rights agenda.  This Section 
discusses how the business and human rights agenda adapted in 
the years following that debate.  Interestingly, business actors that 
were set on ending the Norms adopted a more cooperative attitude 
towards voluntary regulatory initiatives that were already in place 
                                                     
99  Daniel Vasella, Business Must Help Frame New Human Rights Rules, FIN. 
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2004). 
100 Id. 
101 Kinley, supra note 96, at 32. 
102 Id. 
103 See Letter from Cattaui to Kedzia, supra note 90, at 2 (interpreting the UN 
Commission’s decision to mean that “the draft prepared by the Sub-Commission 
was not requested by the Commission, that as a draft it has no legal standing and 
that the Sub-Commission should not perform any monitoring function with re-
spect to the draft”). 
104 Frances Williams, Human Rights to Stay on UN Agenda, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2014. 
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or emerging.  Therefore, the Norms still had important effects on 
the voluntary regulation of business and human rights. 
For example, in 2004—the year that the Norms were effectively 
suspended—the  number of new business signatories to the UN 
Global Compact rose to new levels.105  In mid-2004, there were only 
sixty-one American signatories to the Compact, but nearly a quar-
ter of these signatories joined between March and July 2004.106  
Every subsequent year, the number of new business signatories ex-
ceeded the pre-2004 rates.107  For example, 128 oil producing com-
panies actively participate in the UN Global Compact; only twenty-
two joined prior to 2004.108   
The UN Global Compact was not the only voluntary initiative 
to benefit from industry’s renewed interest.  After the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights tabled the Norms, the UN Secretary 
General appointed John Ruggie as a Special Representative on 
Business and Human Rights.109  Ruggie’s mandate was to “‘identi-
fy and clarify’ international standards and policies in relation to 
business and human rights and to submit ‘views and recommenda-
tions’ for consideration by the commission.”110   
In contrast to their hostility to the Norms, the ICC and the IOE 
sought to engage with Ruggie on his mandate.  The same trade as-
sociations that had opposed the Norms, fearing UN regulation 
over business affairs, were now engaging with the UN’s Special 
Representative on Business & Human Rights.111  The ICC and IOE 
                                                     
105 UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, ACTIVITY REPORT 2013, 6 (2014). 
106  See Alexandra MacRae, More Firms Join UN Push to be Good Corporate Citi-
zens, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 19, 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/
2004/0719/p16s01-wmgn.html [https://perma.cc/97VM-D3Y6] (describing the 
increased membership to the UN Global Compact initiative); Lisa Singhania, 
American Firms Scarce At UN Forum on Ethics, BOSTON GLOBE (June 25, 2004), 
http://archive.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2004/06/25/american_firms
_scarce_at_un_forum_on_ethics/?camp=pm [https://perma.cc/27Q5-KHTQ] 
(“Organizers say that American corporations are starting to sign on at a quicker 
clip.”). 
107  UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 105. 
108 Id. 
109 Giovanni Mantilla, Emerging International Human Rights Norms for Trans-
national Corporations, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 278, 289 (2009). 
110  Id. 
111  In their initial reactions to the mandate of the UN Special Representative, 
the IOE and ICC stressed the importance of consultation with the business com-
munity.  Letter from Guy Sebban, Secretary General, ICC, and Antonios Peñalosa, 
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did this despite their firm position that the world does not need 
another international framework on the subject of business and 
human rights.112   
In 2008, the UN Special Representative introduced his tripartite 
framework for business and human rights known as the “Protect, 
Respect, and Remedy Framework.”113  This framework consists of 
three important but separate pillars:  (a) the state’s duty to protect 
against human rights abuses by third parties; (b) the corporate re-
sponsibility to respect human rights; and (c) greater access by vic-
tims to effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial.114   
The “corporate responsibility to respect” requires that compa-
nies refrain from infringing on the rights of others.115  This respon-
sibility is centered around due diligence, understood as “a process 
whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national laws 
but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to 
avoiding it.”116  A company’s responsibility for due diligence in-
cludes evaluating:  (a) the “country contexts in which their busi-
ness activities take place, to highlight any specific human rights 
challenges they may pose”; (b) “human rights impacts their own 
activities may have within that context - for example, in their ca-
pacity as producers, service providers, employers, and neigh-
bours”; and (c) “whether they might contribute to abuse through 
the relationships connected to their activities, such as with business 
partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State actors.”117  
                                                                                                                        
Secretary General, IOE, to John Ruggie, Special Representative of the UN Secre-
tary-General for “business and human rights” 1 (Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter ICC & 
IOE, Initial Views on the Mandate].  The IOE and the ICC were not the only ones 
adopting a different attitude to voluntary initiatives.  One commentator notes that 
many of the governments that opposed the Norms are also staunch supporters of 
the most important voluntary initiatives on business and human rights.  See Man-
tilla, supra note 109 (noting the support of the governments of the United States 
and the United Kingdom for the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights, as well as South Africa’s role in the Kimberley Process). 
112 Letter from Cattaui to Kedzia, supra note 90, at 4 (“Therefore, the issue in 
our view is not whether we need yet another initiative or standard on business 
and human rights – we do not.”); ICC & IOE, Initial Views on the Mandate, supra 
note 111, at 2. 
113 Framework, supra note 35, at 6. 
114 Id. 
115  Id. 
116 Id. ¶ 25 
117 Id. ¶ 57 
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Appropriate due diligence requires formulating a firm-specific 
human rights policy, impact assessments, integration of the human 
rights policy throughout the firm, and tracking performance 
through monitoring and auditing.118   
Despite these responsibilities, the ICC and IOE did not oppose 
the Ruggie Framework as they had with the Norms.119  Joined by 
the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD 
(BIAC), they supported the due diligence approach to human 
rights,120 even offering to identify a group of companies that could 
serve as resource for the UN Special Representative on due dili-
gence issues.121   
 
4.4.  Phase 4:  The Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on 
an international legally binding instrument on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to 
human rights 
 
On June 26, 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
adopted a resolution “to establish an open-ended intergovernmen-
tal working group with the mandate to elaborate an international 
                                                     
118 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterpris-
es), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Na-
tions “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31  (Mar. 
21, 2011) [hereinafter Ruggie, Guiding Principles] 
119 See INT’L CHAMBER COM. ET AL., JOINT INITIAL VIEWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATION OF EMPLOYERS (IOE), THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
(ICC) AND THE BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE OECD (BIAC) 
TO THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ON THE THIRD REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 1 (2008), https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-
and-materials/Letter-IOE-ICC-BIAC-re-Ruggie-report-May-2008.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WY5E-H2XP] [hereinafter ICC ET AL., Joint Initial Views to the Eighth Ses-
sion of the HRC] (discussing the ICC and IOE’s endorsement of the Ruggie Frame-
work). 
120 Id. at 2.  See also Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 118 (outlining the 
requirements of due diligence). 
121  INT’L CHAMBER COM. ET AL., Joint Views of the International Organisation of 
Employers, the International Chamber of Commerce and the Business and Industry Advi-
sory Committee to the OECD to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
on Business and Human Rights 1 (2009),  [https://perma.cc/9K8T-6N6Z] [hereinaf-
ter ICC & IOE, Joint Views to the Special Representative]. 
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legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights.”122  This resolu-
tion was drafted by Ecuador and South Africa and was supported 
by twenty countries,123 opposed by another fourteen countries,124 
with thirteen additional countries abstaining.125   
The ICC was “disappointed” with the outcome of the resolu-
tion.126  It warned that “the adoption of a resolution for a binding 
human rights treaty on multinational corporations will undermine 
progress already made by the widely supported UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights.”127  It reiterated its persis-
tent fear that this treaty—like the Norms that preceded it—would 
shift human rights obligations from states to the transnational 
business sector.128  It concluded its initial reaction by re-
emphasizing its commitment to voluntary regulation under the 
UN Guiding Principles.129   
Following the first session of the Intergovernmental Working 
Group on an international legally binding instrument on business 
and human rights, the ICC submitted a joint statement with the 
IOE, BIAC, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Devel-
opment (WBCSD).130  The trade organizations emphasized the suc-
                                                     
122 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally 
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterpris-
es with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, at 2 (June 
24, 2014). 
123 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethio-
pia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philip-
pines, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela, Vietnam.  UN Human Rights Council Ses-
sion, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (2014), http://business-humanrights.org/
en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions [https://perma.cc/K6B5-
WZYT]. 
124 Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Montenegro, South Korea, Romania, Macedonia, UK, USA.  Id. 
125 Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, 
Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, UAE.  Id. 
126  ICC Disappointed by Ecuador Initiative Adoption, INT’L CHAMBER COM. (June 
30, 2014), http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ICC-disappointed-by-
Ecuador-Initiative-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/7TVG-52YB]. 
127  Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 INT’L CHAMBER COM. ET AL., UN TREATY PROCESS ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY ON A 
WAY FORWARD 1 (2015) [hereinafter ICC ET AL., Initial Observations on a Way For-
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cesses with the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness & Human Rights, which they identified as the “authoritative 
international framework on business and human rights.”131  They 
pointed to the influence of the Principles on industry operations, 
“rang[ing] from public commitments on human rights policies, en-
hancement of governance mechanisms related to human rights, in-
cluding efforts to improve understanding of impacts across diverse 
functions and to undertake human rights due diligence in diverse 
forms, as well as training programmes and capacity building both 
within the company and with business partners.”132   
While continuing to emphasize the role of government actors, 
the initial comments by the trade associations did not take issue 
with the idea of a legally binding instrument, per se.  Instead, they 
chose to comment on the substantive content of such an instru-
ment.133  Specifically, the trade associations argued that aspects of 
the UN Guiding Principles should be adopted within a new inter-
national treaty.134   
One factor motivating the call for a treaty is the demand for ac-
countability and remedies.  In 2013, over 600 organizations span-
ning the world signed a joint statement emphasizing the need for 
                                                                                                                        
ward]. 
131 Id.; Press Release, Int’l Org. Emps., IOE Calls for Use of Existing Mecha-
nisms in Discussion on UN Treaty Process on Business and Human Rights (June 7, 
2015), http://www.ioe-emp.org/policy-areas/csr/csr-news-details/article/ioe-
calls-for-use-of-existing-mechanisms-in-discussion-on-un-treaty-process-on-
business-and-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/T23Q-UB73]. 
132 ICC ET AL., Initial Observations on a Way Forward, supra note 130, at 1. 
133  See Oral Statement, International Organization of Employers, Open De-
bate on Different Approaches and Criteria for the Future Definition of the Scope 
of the International Legally Binding Instrument (Oct. 27, 2016), https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/InternationalOrganization
Employers.doc [https://perma.cc/S8YU-ECTN] (arguing for a broad treaty scope 
by explaining, “[T]o have an effective, international legally binding instrument, . . 
. it is of fundamental importance that the scope of this treaty should include all 
business enterprises, which means not only multinational enterprises, but also 
state-owned enterprises and domestic enterprises.”). 
134 Oral Statement, International Chamber of Commerce, The Relation Be-
tween the United Nations Guiding Principles and the Elaboration of an Interna-
tional Legally Binding Instrument on TNCs and Other Business Enterprises (Oct. 
27, 2016) (https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/
InternationalChamberCommerce.doc [https://perma.cc/VF63-JSAG] (“Any le-
gally binding instrument should be based on the UNGPs’ three-pillar architec-
ture.”). 
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an international legally binding instrument on business and hu-
man rights.135  Part of their motivation was their belief in the need 
“to ensure access to justice and remedy and reparations for victims 
of corporate human rights abuse.”136  Consequently, they want a 
treaty that “[p]rovides for an international monitoring and ac-
countability mechanism” and “[r]equires States Parties to provide 
for legal liability for business enterprises for acts or omissions that 
infringe human rights.”137  As national courts close their doors to 
corporate misconduct abroad, NGOs demand new and effective fo-
ra for the resolution of disputes involving toxic contamination, 
building collapses, and even armed violence.138  The treaty’s sup-
porters hope that it can provide access to remedies that are current-
ly unavailable to many affected communities.139  For example, Ec-
uador’s Ambassador to the United Nations, H.E. Luis Gallegos 
Chiriboga, stated that the resolution proposed by Ecuador and 
South Africa “could level the playing field of victims deprived of a 
voice for many years in search of corporate liability and accounta-
                                                     
135 Joint Statement, Call for an International Legally Binding Instrument on 
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Nov. 
1, 2013), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/call-for-
binding-instrument.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WSE-L2AA] (prepared during the 
People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business in Bangkok, Thailand, Nov. 5–7, 
2013) (calling for states to agree to enforce human rights obligations against busi-
nesses and to create an effective monitoring and accountability mechanism). 
136 Id. 
137  Id. 
138 See, e.g., COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET LA 
SOLIDARITÉ, UN BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK: TIME TO OPEN 
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS TOWARDS DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL LEGALLY 
BINDING INSTRUMENT 3 (2015) (“By ratifying this instrument, a State would express 
its consent to a new monitoring and enforcement mechanism applying directly to 
the transnational corporations under its jurisdiction.”) (bold removed). 
139 Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, All States Must Participate in Good Faith in 
the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on Business and Human Rights 2 
(June 18, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
IOR4018972015ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6Z8-QXS4].  See also CHRIS 
ALBIN-LACKEY, HUM. RTS. WATCH, WITHOUT RULES: A FAILED APPROACH TO 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/related_material/business.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E57-GWL4]. (“[W]ithout 
any mechanism to ensure compliance or to measure implementation, they cannot 
actually require companies to do anything at all. Companies can reject the princi-
ples altogether without consequence—or publicly embrace them while doing ab-
solutely nothing to put them into practice.”).   
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bility.”140   
Access to remedies is not a unique feature of a potential treaty 
on business and human rights.  Instead, it is already recommended 
under other regulatory approaches concerning business and hu-
man rights.  Under Article 29 of the UN Guiding Principles, “busi-
ness enterprises should establish or participate in effective opera-
tional-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and 
communities who may be adversely impacted.”141  An operational-
level grievance mechanism is “accessible directly to individuals 
and communities who may be adversely impacted by a business” 
and “can engage the business enterprise directly in assessing the 
issues and seeking remediation of any harm.”142  Businesses can 
administer these mechanisms either independently or in collabora-
tion with other stakeholders, such as NGOs.143  Corporations’ fail-
ure to make good on this requirement under voluntary regulation 
may now drive NGO demands for better accountability through a 
treaty.   
 
4.5.  Summary:  Penumbral Effects 
 
The Section below discusses whether the regulatory history 
discussed above illustrates evidence of penumbral effects in prac-
tice.  
 4.5.1.  Pre-emptive Penumbral Effects 
 
The first type of penumbral effects are pre-emptive penumbral 
effects.  These occur when industry actors attempt to discourage 
treaty regulation in a particular policy area by upgrading their cur-
rent practices, especially voluntary regulation, in the prelude to a 
                                                     
140 H.E. Luis Gallegos Chiriboga, Human Rights Defenders: The Cornerstone for 
the Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument in Business and Human 
Rights, INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.ishr.ch/news/stating-
case-how-human-rights-defenders-can-gain-strengthened-implementation 
[https://perma.cc/2ZZF-HC4H]. 
141  Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 118, at 25. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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treaty.  Extreme examples of pre-emptive effects occur when cor-
porations intentionally self-regulate in order to pre-empt treaty 
regulation.144  However, preemptive effects may also occur even 
when the causation is less clear. 
Those dissatisfied with voluntary regulation are looking to 
treaty intervention through binding norms.145  One deficiency iden-
tified by treaty proponents is the inadequate access to remedies by 
victims of human rights abuses by transnational corporations.146  
But that situation may be changing.  A number of corporations 
adopted operational-level grievance mechanisms over the past few 
years.  In 2014, the Working Group on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises con-
vened a workshop of experts to discuss non-judicial access to rem-
edies.147  According to their report, although operational-level 
grievance mechanisms are not yet mainstream, “[t]here is a general 
impression that operational-level grievance mechanisms. . . . have 
increased in number since the Guiding Principles were endorsed in 
2011.”148   
In 2013, a study on operational-level grievance mechanisms 
performed by the International Institute for Environment and De-
velopment (IIED) found that there was “a growing number of 
grievance mechanisms in operation today.”149  According to the re-
port, the proliferation of grievance mechanisms reflected both wid-
er application and more purposeful and integrated use of the 
grievance mechanisms.150  The report identified twenty company-
community grievance mechanisms used by companies in the ex-
tractive sector, including BP, ExxonMobile, Rio Tinto, and New-
                                                     
144 See notes 53–55 and accompanying text.  
145 See notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
146 Id. 
147 Rep. of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Report from an Expert Work-
shop entitled “Business Impacts and Non-Judicial Access to Remedy: Emerging Global 
Experience” held in Toronto in 2013, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/25/Add.3 (Apr. 25, 
2014). 
148 Id. ¶ 17. 
149 David Vermijs, Overview of Company-Community Grievance Mechanisms, in 
DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE? COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY-LED GRIEVANCE 
MECHANISMS 14, 22 (Emma Wilson & Emma Blackmore eds., 2013). 
150 Id. 
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mont.151  This list was based on publicly available information, and 
the authors, based on interviews with industry representatives, be-
lieve that the “total number is likely to be exponentially greater.”152  
The report also found that “more companies, particularly in the ex-
tractive industries, are adopting far-reaching, companywide com-
mitments to having grievance mechanisms in place at all of their 
sites with substantial risks for community impacts.”153   
Despite the suggestiveness of these signs, these developments 
are not likely signals of preemptive effects in action.  It does not 
appear that industry actors are undertaking self-regulation in re-
sponse to the threat of a treaty on business and human rights.154  
The treaty threat is too remote and speculative given that the pro-
cess has only begun and is at least ten years away.  At a minimum, 
these effects depend on states’ ability to signal capacity and will-
ingness to employ treaty regulation.  Recent challenges and fail-
ures of such regulation undermine the likelihood of these effects. 
However, even if pre-emptive penumbral effects are absent, there 
is support for the other forms of penumbral effects. 
 
4.5.2.  Coordination Penumbral Effects 
 
Coordination effects refer to industry actors’ willingness to use 
treaty, or prospective treaty, defaults as a basis for coordinated 
voluntary action.  This responsiveness can take the form of support 
or opposition by industry actors to treaty regulation.   
For example, the regulatory threat of the Global Norm was 
most apparent to industry between 2003–2004 when the ICC and 
the IOE opposed the development of the Norms.155  Even if indus-
try ultimately won out, they expended considerable resources in 
opposing the Norms.156  The magnitude of the opposition is a tes-
tament to the severity of the risk.  The UN Global Norms did exert 
reputational costs on those industry actors who opposed the 
                                                     
151 Id. at 23. 
152 Id. at 22. 
153 Id. at 24. 
154 Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor, supra note 64. 
155 See supra notes 91–101 and accompanying text. 
156 See id. 
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Norms.  In the words of former Shell VP Robin Aram, “‘This epi-
sode . . . has not been without damage to business. It has linked 
business with a perception of hostility to human rights.’”157 
This damage caused by the debate over the Norms may have 
contributed to industry attitudes and engagement with the Ruggie 
Principles in the wake of the Norms.  The ICC and IOE engaged 
with Ruggie Tripartite Framework and the UN Guiding Principles 
in a very different manner compared to their hostility to the Global 
Norms.158  With the Ruggie Framework, the industry associations 
desired engagement and consultation and even offered their ser-
vices with data collection and information dissemination.159  The 
ICC, IOE, and BIAC volunteered to collaborate with the UN Spe-
cial Representative on implementing the third pillar of the Ruggie 
Framework:  access to remedies.160  Specifically, they offered to 
“identify a small number of companies from relevant sectors that 
would test pilot these Principles at plant or project level and dis-
seminate the results as part of the learning experience.”161  Interest-
ingly, the Norms had also contained a similar requirement that 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises “provide 
prompt, effective, and adequate reparation to those persons, enti-
ties, and communities that have been adversely affected by failures 
to comply with these Norms.”162  Despite their opposition to the 
Norms, industry actors seemed more receptive to the remedy pro-
visions of the Ruggie Framework and the UN Guiding Principles.  
These statements of support were not empty promises by the 
trade associations.  Over an eight week period in 2012, the ICC and 
IOE, in collaboration with other organizations, disseminated a pilot 
survey project throughout their business networks in order to as-
sess the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles.163  The sur-
                                                     
157 Rabin, supra note 96. 
158 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
159 Id. 
160 ICC & IOE, Joint Views to the Special Representative, supra note 121. 
161 Id. 
162 UN Global Norms, supra note 91, art. 18.  One reason that the trade associ-
ations may have supported the move to provide remedies is to discourage the ex-
tra-territorial application of laws.  ICC ET AL., Joint Initial Views to the Eighth Session 
of the HRC, supra note 119, at 2. 
163 Working Group on Business & Human Rights, Report of Pilot Business 
Survey on Implementation of the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1
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vey was intended to identify current approaches and practices 
within different sectors (such as awareness of human rights, policy 
commitment, capacity development, policy integration, and report-
ing), as well as identifying obstacles to implementation.164   
In 2015, IPIECA, the global oil and gas industry association for 
environmental and social issues, produced a manual for imple-
menting operational-level grievance mechanisms in the oil and gas 
industry.165  This manual was based on the practical experiences of 
seven pilot operational-level community grievance mechanisms 
conducted by IPIECA member companies, as well as shared learn-
ing from additional IPIECA members and stakeholder engage-
ment.166  Moreover, this manual uses the effectiveness criteria pro-
vided in the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights 
as the benchmarks for implementing successful community-level 
grievance mechanisms.167   
Some may view these examples as evidence of the success of 
soft law regulation over other forms of regulation.  However, it is 
important to view different types of regulation as part of the same 
narrative.  The combination of voluntary initiatives and binding 
regulation facilitate results difficult to obtain through either alone.  
It is important to highlight points of contemporaneous develop-
ment by also examining the negative spaces—the treaties that did 
not emerge and the voluntary initiatives that floundered.  These 
negative spaces reveal the importance of not only examining regu-
latory methods that succeeded but also those that failed and plac-
ing both developments in context.  When situated such, both sets 
of developments tend to overlap.  The regulatory history of busi-
ness and human rights is not a testament to the triumph of volun-
tary initiatives over other regulatory forms.  Instead, the milestones 
                                                                                                                        
Rights 2 (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/
ForumSession1/Report_UNWGBusinessSurvey_Dec2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZK8W-LT7C]. 
164 Id. at 3. 
165 See generally IPIECA, COMMUNITY GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN THE OIL AND 
GAS INDUSTRY: MANUAL FOR IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONAL-LEVEL GRIEVANCE 
MECHANISMS AND DESIGNING CORPORATE FRAMEWORKS (2015) (providing a practi-
cal guide to aid planning and implementing operational-level community griev-
ance mechanisms). 
166 Id. at 2. 
167 Id. at 3. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
 
322 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
 
 
reached may partially result from the failed regulatory strategies, 
like the Norms, that also litter this history.   
 
4.5.3.  Noise Penumbral Effects 
 
The noise created by the treaty process can also precipitate in-
dustry reform.  Specifically, this noise creates pressure for reform 
of current business practices, awareness of policy issues and weak-
nesses with self-regulation and reputational shaming.  These ef-
fects relate to coordination effects and can provide the stimulus for 
the latter.   
According to a policy advisor for a large transnational corpora-
tion, it is unlikely that many corporations will engage in internal 
reform of corporate practices concerning business and human 
rights without this noise.168  The combined attention on the im-
portance of access to remedies—an issue particularly publicized by 
proponents of a treaty on business and human rights—provides 
external pressure for internal change within corporations.169   
Critically, these productive noise effects are not unique to a 
treaty consultation and negotiation process.  Voluntary initiatives, 
such as the UN Global Compact and UN Guiding Principles, also 
displayed similar features by increasing awareness of important 
policy issues and recommending strategies for improvement.  
These features are also shared by other enforcement strategies such 
as activist litigation.  For example, the wave of human rights litiga-
tion in federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute created public 
awareness of transnational business practices.  The complaints 
filed by plaintiffs documented serious human rights violations in-
volving well known multinational corporations in the United 
States and abroad.  Such litigation exposed named corporations 
and their associated industries to public scrutiny and shaming.   
This litigation threat continues even after Kiobel v. Dutch Petro-
leum.170  Lawsuits continue to serve as a driver for industry self-
regulation, especially concerning the provision of remedies and 
                                                     
168 Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor, supra note 64. 
169 Id. 
170 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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non-judicial grievance mechanisms.171  For example, lawsuits 
against Nestle, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), and Cargill alleg-
ing forced labor and torture formed the background for the cocoa 
industry to adopt voluntary initiatives in these policy areas.172  
Similar initiatives to address modern day slavery in the shrimp 
supply chains are receiving a lot of attention because of recent law-
suits filed against Nestle and Costco.173   
Therefore, what matters is the collective creation of pressure 
points, such as increased public awareness and brand shaming.  
These pressure points can arise from the attention around a consul-
tation process for a new treaty but can similarly accompany the in-
troduction of new multi-stakeholder initiatives or the filing of a 
lawsuit against an industry actor.  
What all these sources have in common is the aggregation of 
leverage by non-state actors vis-à-vis large corporations.  States 
possess unique sources of leverage over corporations that non-state 
actors do not possess.  Unfortunately, these state sources have 
proven inadequate to address all forms of transnational corporate 
wrongdoing.  The history of business and human rights is also a 
history of a range of non-state actors attempting to affect business 
behavior.  Individually, these actors do not possess the coercive 
qualities of state actors.  Collectively, however, they can aggregate 
their own particular forms of leverage (NGO reports, media pub-
licity, consumer boycotts, domestic litigation) to increase aware-
                                                     
171 Telephone Interview with Mil Niepold, Senior Mediator (Sept. 8, 2015) 
[hereinafter September 8 Interview]. 
172 Id.  See also Pettersson & Burnson, supra note 4 (“In 2001, Nestle and other 
top chocolate makers and cocoa processors agreed to a plan to investigate and end 
child slave-labor practices on farms in West Africa that supplied them with cocoa. 
The industry collaboration followed media reports that boys as young as 11 were 
sold or tricked into slavery to harvest cocoa beans on some of the Ivory Coast’s 
600,000 farms.”). 
173 September 8 Interview, supra note 171.  See also Pettersson & Burnson, su-
pra note 4 (reporting that Nestle was sued because of claims that its “Fancy Feast” 
cat food contained fish from a supplier that uses slave labor and that purchasers 
of the pet food would not have purchased the food had they known of the pur-
chasing practices).  Erik Larson, Costco Sued Over Claims Shrimp Harvested With 
Slave Labor, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-08-19/costco-sued-over-claims-shrimp-is-harvested-with-
slave-labor [https://perma.cc/LQ48-7RPM] (reporting that Costco was sued for 
purchasing prawns from Thailand, where they are caught by unpaid forced labor-
ers, and misrepresenting its supply chain to consumers). 
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ness of harmful practices, recommend strategies for improvement, 
and shame recalcitrant corporations.174  Such leverage may be var-
ied and indirect but may prove as, or even more, effective as tradi-
tional state regulation over business actors.  
 
*  *  * 
 
The lessons of this case study are important for at least two au-
diences. First, those advocating for a new treaty on business and 
human rights should pay particular attention to the past in order to 
understand the non-traditional functions of treaty negotiations and 
to recognize treaty penumbras.  This understanding reveals the 
importance of voluntary regulation through this process.  It sug-
gests that those actors consulting, drafting, and negotiating a draft 
treaty should undertake these functions with an eye towards 
achieving these penumbral effects as second best options.  These 
implications thereby transform the treaty negotiation process from 
single-objective (outcome based, focused on developments in for-
mal treaty process) to a dual-objective that also considers the ef-
fects of the treaty process on industry actors. 
Second, these lessons are also potentially relevant for actors 
negotiating treaties in other contexts.  This case study focused on 
the policy area of business and human rights in order to provide an 
in-depth analysis of the regulatory history in this area.  This focus 
does not mean that penumbral effects are limited to issues of busi-
ness and human rights.  Instead, these findings are consistent with 
industry practices in a variety of policy areas in the domestic con-
text.175  Further empirical research may reveal analogous regulato-
ry histories for other international policy areas as well.  The objec-
tive of this article is to illustrate penumbral effects in one policy 
area that can illuminate further research on the role of treaties in 
the regulation of other policy issues.  
 
                                                     
174 See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 747, 797–801 (2014) (describing how non-state actors, using the “reflexive co-
ordination” approach and “recogniz[ing] the varied pressure points offered by 
other actors,” can coordinate their behavior to exercise leverage over a specific in-
dustry to facilitate an adjustment in behavior). 
175 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
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5.  IMPLICATIONS OF PENUMBRAL EFFECTS 
 
Penumbral effects matter because these effects can facilitate 
treaty objectives even when a treaty does not emerge or does not 
perform as expected.  Treaty proponents can encourage their de-
sired changes by monitoring and engaging in the penumbral ef-
fects of the treaty or treaty process on voluntary regulation.  These 
effects are not apparent under the classic lens of public interna-
tional law that focuses on state behavior.  Instead, penumbral ef-
fects occur off-stage in the realm of private ordering, but they can 
still be significant.  Moreover, these effects concern the very chang-
es that many treaties are ultimately attempting to achieve:  behav-
ior by business organizations.  It is therefore important to include 
these effects in any assessment of the goals of a treaty process or 
evaluation of its results.  The following section describes ways that 
treaty proponents and policymakers can operationalize penumbral 
effects strategically.  It also identifies implications of penumbral ef-
fects policymakers may need to consider.  
  
5.1.  Maximizing the Noise Effects:  Shareholders as Intermediaries 
 
If the threats to treaty-making are significant, then pre-emptive 
penumbral effects are unlikely; instead, we will need to rely more 
on noise and coordination effects.176  Unfortunately, treaty negotia-
tions take a long time and a firm’s management is unlikely to pay 
particular attention to the distant noise of a prospective treaty that 
is too remote and speculative; these are precisely the reasons that 
firms do not fear a prospective treaty on business and human 
rights.177  But noise is dynamic, and there are important strategies 
for amplifying that noise.  If firms will not pay attention to a dis-
tant treaty, and the policy noise surrounding it, then policy makers 
should use the treaty process to get the attention of actors who firm 
representatives will not ignore:  shareholder intermediaries.  
Some shareholders, such as institutional investors, are already 
                                                     
176 See supra Section 3 (discussing the calibration between penumbral effects 
and threats to treaty making). 
177 Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor, supra note 64. 
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urging large corporations to conform their corporate policies to in-
ternational human rights standards.178  This behavior is part of a 
phenomenon that Virginia Harper Ho describes as “risk-related ac-
tivism,” which refers to the “exercise of shareholder governance 
rights to motivate firms to effectively monitor, manage, and dis-
close risk, including nonfinancial environmental, social and gov-
ernance (ESG) risks.”179  Human rights, and other ESG issues, are 
important because they can “impact a firms’ financial performance, 
such as corporate governance, labor and employment standards, 
human resource management, and environmental practices.”180   
Even if firms ignore treaty noise, some shareholders pay atten-
tion to international human rights standards—both “formal” treaty 
norms and non-binding norms from soft law guidelines and even 
“failed” treaties.  For example, the UN Global Norms re-emerged 
in an unlikely setting:  a 2014 shareholder proposal submitted by a 
group of religiously affiliated shareholders to the corporate execu-
tives of Caterpillar.181  This proposal referenced the Norms and 
urged Caterpillar’s leadership to review and modify its internal 
corporate policies to bring them in line with international human 
rights standards articulated in other sources, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the core labor 
standards of the International Labour Organization, and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights.182    
Shareholder actions like these amplify the penumbral noise ef-
fects of international standards by using the latter as reference 
points for corporate reform.  In the Caterpillar example, sharehold-
ers demanded change by using a shareholder proposal under Rule 
14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.183  This rule allows 
                                                     
178 INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., 2014 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: ENVIRONMENTAL & 
SOCIAL ISSUES 6 (2014). 
179 Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 650–51  
(2016).  
180 Id. at 651. 
181 Caterpillar Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 67–68 (May 1, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18230/000001823014000144/def14a
_2014xproxyxv25.htm [https://perma.cc/35HW-WVFB]. 
182 Id. at 67. 
183 Ho, supra note 179, at 661 (noting that shareholder proposals have “his-
torically been the most widely used and least expensive means of shareholder ac-
tivism”). 
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qualifying investors to submit a proposal to the company that it 
wants included in the annual meeting of the shareholders.184  
Shareholder proposals often serve to signal to management that 
the shareholders want to start a conversation on a particular top-
ic.185  Once a shareholder proposal is received, a company’s man-
agement may be required to include an eligible proposal in its 
proxy statement that is distributed to all shareholders before the 
next annual shareholder meeting, possibly with an accompanying 
statement of opposition.186   
This proposal is not alone.  According to Institutional Share-
holder Services (ISS), a private proxy advisor, shareholders filed 
more resolutions concerning environmental and social standards 
than corporate governance in 2014; this had not occurred since the 
1980s.187  There was also an increase in the number of resolutions 
concerning human rights with sixteen resolutions demanding im-
proved human rights risk assessments.188  Additionally, the resolu-
tions that were voted upon received relatively high levels of share-
holder support.189  
These examples of shareholder action magnify penumbral 
noise effects in two important ways.  First, Rule 14a-8 allows activ-
ist shareholders to disseminate policy recommendations and inter-
national norms among the corporation’s shareholders using the 
proxy statement; this tool allows shareholders to learn of interna-
tional norms when they otherwise may not.  Second, management 
may also meet and negotiate a withdrawal of the proposal by the 
shareholders.190  These withdrawals are also significant.  They sig-
nal that management and the shareholders submitting a proposal 
may have reached a privately negotiated agreement regarding 
company practices going forward.191  In these agreements, a firm’s 
representatives set out commitments regarding how the business 
                                                     
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of 
Public Elections, 126 Yale L. J. 262, 266 (2016). 
187 INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 178, at 1. 
188 Id. at 37. 
189 Id. at 38. 
190 Haan, supra note 186, at 279-80.. 
191 See id.  
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will operate in the future.  For example, in the campaign finance 
context, “at least thirty-one proposal settlements set campaign fi-
nance disclosure standards at U.S. public companies” between 
2014–2015.192  In light of this trend, Sarah Haan claims that share-
holder proposal settlements offer a promising avenue for reform-
ing corporate social and environmental policies.193   
Privately negotiated settlements demonstrate ways that share-
holders enforce public norms.  Those desiring improved human 
rights practices by corporations may want to employ a similar 
strategy to achieve corporate reform.  Under such a strategy, inves-
tors will “short-cut” the pathway from non-binding international 
human rights standards to corporate policies by serving as both 
audiences and enforcers of these human rights standards.  This 
demonstrates yet another way that private intermediaries can am-
plify “failed treaties” or other non-binding standards.  
 
5.2.  Iterative Upgrading of the Baseline 
 
Change is a challenging task for both voluntary regulation and 
public regulation.  The history discussed in Section 4, supra, sug-
gests that the interaction between the two forms of regulation up-
grades the baseline between cycles of each.  Section 4, supra, dis-
cusses at least two cycles of both voluntary regulation and 
attempted public regulation in the area of business and human 
rights.  These cycles suggest that change is a product of both and 
not a consequence of only one.  Industry reacts to both in each cy-
cle.  When one cycle ends and another begins, the starting point for 
the conversation is a little different.194   
History may not repeat itself with the debate about an interna-
tional legally binding instrument on business and human rights.  
As before, industry opposes it, but the nature of the opposition is 
different.  Part of industry’s opposition to the Norms was its 
                                                     
192 Id. at 285. 
193 Id. at 266-67.  See id. at 265 (“Although reform of campaign finance disclo-
sure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, disclosure reform is 
steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering.”). 
194  Kinley, supra note 96 at 31. 
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“packaging” in legalistic form.195  A number of industry actors pre-
ferred to leave business and human rights outside the realm of le-
gally binding instruments.196  
This time around, the IOE, as a representative of the global 
business community, does not ignore the work of the intergov-
ernmental group and instead seeks engagement with the treaty 
process.197  This is in sharp contrast to industry’s aloofness to the 
preparation of the UN Global Norms.198  Second, the ICC, IOE, and 
other industry representatives appear as engaged with the sub-
stance of an international treaty as its existence.199  In their first set of 
initial observations, these industry actors provide specific recom-
mendations on the content of a treaty or international initiative on 
business and human rights.200    
There are a few explanations for this engagement.  First, indus-
try may be interested in the substantive content of a treaty in order 
to limit their exposure.  Second, and as a related point, industry ac-
tors may desire to preserve their inclusion in the consultation pro-
cess.  One of the key reasons that industry actors were more recep-
tive to the Ruggie Framework and the Guiding Principles 
compared to the Global Norms was because of the consultation 
process used with the former.201  They may desire at least the ap-
pearance of cooperation in order to avoid subsequent ostracism, as 
occurred with the international regulation of tobacco.202  Activists 
                                                     
195 Id. at 36; Vasella, supra note 99. 
196  Kinley, supra note 96, at 36; Vasella, supra note 99. 
197  IOE Roundup of Proceedings of the IWG on UN Treaty on Business & Human 
Rights, INT’L ORG. EMPS. (July 13, 2015), http://www.ioe-emp.org/index.php?
id=2464 [https://perma.cc/G3WQ-E8ZK] (noting that the IOE participated in the 
intergovernmental working group’s first session and that it planned to continue 
its engagement in the treaty-making process). 
198 Rabin, supra note 96 (noting that the majority of companies chose not to 
engage in the UN Global Norms consultation process); Weissbrodt, supra note 78, 
at 383.   
199  ICC ET AL., Initial Observations on a Way Forward, supra note 130, at 1 (ad-
vocating for a treaty or “international initiative” that covers all companies, re-
quires States to develop National Action Plans, and avoids new legal liabilities for 
companies along global supply chains, among other suggestions). 
200 Id. 
201 September 8 Interview, supra note 171 (explaining the credibility of the 
Ruggie Principles and the consultation process involved). 
202 See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, art. 5.3, Feb. 27, 
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have called on similar bans against industry in treaty talks con-
cerning climate change203 and also business and human rights.204  
As always, it is difficult to pinpoint the causes of these changes 
in industry attitudes, but it is important to note the differences.  
These differences are productive because it means that the conver-
sation regarding important, but controversial, international policy 
issues has a different starting point at the beginning of each cycle.  
Certain assumptions are no longer contested, and the parties may 
move on to new challenges.  As a result, parties, even antagonistic 
ones, may begin at a slightly different starting point compared to 
previous years, even if they are once again polarized regarding the 
desirability or content of a new regulation in a particular issue ar-
ea. 
 
5.3.  Treaties as Process vs. Treaties as Products 
 
A treaty process is successful not only if it results in a binding 
treaty entering into force—“treaties as products”—but also if it can 
facilitate voluntary compliance with socially desirable goals con-
sistent with the treaty in development.  One issue concerns wheth-
er there is tension between “treaties as process” versus “treaties as 
products.”  Actors desiring to maximize the beneficial regulatory 
effects of “treaties as process” may pursue particular strategic 
                                                                                                                        
2005, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166, http://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q846-CDWP] (providing for the regulation of tobacco).  See 
also WHO FCTC, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5.3 OF THE WHO 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 2–9 (2008), http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/
article_5_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG38-9GG6] (listing guidelines unfavorable to 
the tobacco industry and specifying how outside parties should interact with the 
tobacco industry in order to promote public health policies). 
203 Open Letter Calling for Rules to Protect the Integrity of Climate Policy-Making 
from Vested Corporate Interests, CORP. EUROPE (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://corporateeurope.org/blog/open-letter-calling-rules-protect-integrity-
climate-policy-making-vested-corporate-interests [https://perma.cc/URU7-
K8SZ] (showing that more than seventy-five civil society organizations had 
signed on to the open letter calling on the U.N. to protect environmental policy 
negotiations from the fossil fuel industry’s influence). 
204  See Bobby Ramakant, What Can We Learn from Industry Interference around 
the Global Tobacco Treaty?, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR: BLOG (July 23, 2015), 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/what-can-we-learn-from-industry-
interference-around-the-global-tobacco-treaty [https://perma.cc/M4XF-GM4A]  
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choices that reduce the likelihood that an actual treaty (“treaty as 
product”) may eventually result from the process.     
One strategic factor that aids “treaties as process” but may im-
pede “treaties as products” is transparency.  A strategy that at-
tempts to maximize the noise from a treaty process may depend on 
a certain level of transparency regarding the treaty process in order 
for the signaling function to work.  For example, industry actors 
may need to know how quickly the treaty process is moving along 
in order to gauge its regulatory threat.  Similarly, the content of a 
prospective treaty may influence external actors regarding volun-
tary self-regulation but only if these actors have some awareness of 
this content.       
These “spillover effects” of a prospective treaty process are de-
pendent upon a certain degree of transparency.  The challenge is 
that lack of transparency is often the norm in treaty negotiations.  
For example, in July 2015, treaty negotiators drew the ire of politi-
cians and civil society actors regarding their confidentiality policies 
concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP).205  The European Commission released a new rule restrict-
ing politicians’ access to the text to a secure “reading room” in 
Brussels.206  These rules were adopted in order to protect the pro-
cess against leaks that could undermine the negotiations process.  
The “reading room” rule was adopted after a series of leaks had 
occurred.207  According to news sources, the Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (TPP) also had a “similar super-secure reading room.”208  This 
is one example of tension between choices facilitating “treaties as 
process” versus “treaties as products,” but there may be other fac-
tors that promote the former to the neglect of the other.   
 
                                                     
205 See Zachary Davies Boren, TTIP Controversy: Secret Trade Deal Can Only Be 
Read in Secure ‘Reading Room’ in Brussels, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 17, 2015), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ttip-controversy-secret-
trade-deal-can-only-be-read-secure-in-reading-room-in-brussels-10456206.html 
[https://perma.cc/7XS2-AWLF] (detailing the additional security measures put 
into place after several leaks threatened the confidentiality of the TTIP text). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See id. (quoting Robert Smith, host of NPR’s Planet Money). 
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5.4.  Thick Treaties, Thin Treaties 
 
Penumbral effects are external effects of the treaty or the treaty-
making process.  This article elaborated on a few types of penum-
bral effects, but this is not an exhaustive list.  Much of this discus-
sion related to the importance of penumbral effects for treaties that 
may never emerge for many of the reasons discussed in Section 2.2.  
Further research could explore factors that amplify the penumbral 
effects of treaties in force.  Here is why it matters:  penumbral ef-
fects may partially compensate for institutional features of treaties.  
In this context, penumbral effects concern what kind of institution-
al features that a treaty will possess.   
These types of penumbral effects are not equally significant for 
all treaties.  Some treaties are rich in institutional features, includ-
ing well-developed enforcement mechanisms.  In these situations, 
penumbral effects may not be as important because the treaty’s de-
sign features are already robust and address important issues, such 
as enforcement.  External institutional features may facilitate com-
pliance, but the treaty itself provides incentives for actor compli-
ance.  Penumbral effects are only important here when these de-
sign features are compromised or ineffective. 
Other treaties, however, are “thinner” with fewer institutional 
features.  This can become a problem when this institutional profile 
results from lack of cooperation:  the treaty is thin not because 
that’s what the parties wanted but because it was what they could 
agree upon.  For example, a treaty that could have benefited from 
an enforcement mechanism may have lost it during the treaty ne-
gotiation process as a compromise between the parties or because 
the parties could not agree on the features of the enforcement 
mechanism.  In these situations, penumbral effects can partially 
compensate for the institutional weaknesses of the treaty’s design 
or operation.  Penumbral effects may offer incentives for compli-
ance that are lacking or inadequate in the treaty itself.  In this way, 
these penumbral effects provide hybrid institutional features that 
may even resemble the institutional features of thicker, institution-
ally developed treaties.  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article introduced the concept of “treaty penumbras” to 
explain how treaties exert indirect effects on businesses.  Penum-
bras are important because they illuminate how a treaty may still 
succeed even if it is failing under a statist framework.  Specifically, 
the treaty process generates positive penumbral effects within the 
realm of voluntary industry regulation that can incentivize im-
proved business behavior.  In this way, penumbral effects can par-
tially compensate for treaties that fail to live up to our expectations.  
That is why it is important to account for penumbral effects when 
we evaluate treaty success.    
Penumbras illustrate how the treaty process can be as im-
portant as the treaty product that the process is intended to 
achieve.  However, penumbral effects do not substitute for treaty 
regulation; instead, these effects are dependent upon treaty regula-
tion in general even if these effects can compensate for failed treaty 
regulation in a specific policy area.  If treaty making is robust, all 
three forms of penumbral effects (preemptive, noise, and coordina-
tion) can foster improved business behavior.  However, if treaty 
making is declining or non-existent, the possibilities for penumbral 
effects also decline, especially preemptive effects.  We may expect 
noise and coordination effects even in this situation, but these ef-
fects may also disappear if all treaty making declines too substan-
tially.  In other words, penumbral effects offer hope in a world of 
dwindling treaties but they also vanish in a world without treaties.  
The implications in the article arose from a close examination 
of only one international policy area.  This examination yields in-
sight that is significant for the hundreds of NGOs, labor unions, re-
ligious organizations, government officials, and industry repre-
sentatives who are invested in the outcome of the treaty process 
concerning business and human rights.  These implications are also 
relevant to treaty negotiations that similarly target business con-
duct.  Additional empirical research may reveal similar penumbras 
in other international policy areas that policymakers can use to re-
inforce other treaty norms.   
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